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Message to our readers:
This paper is formed by two entities.
– The main text describes the results submitted for journal publication (pages 3–56).
– An appendix (Appendix C, starting on page 57) provides additional results that were not in-
cluded in the journal submission.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that governments may lie strategically to the public about economic data
that they collect and provide. The accusations that Greece and Italy tinkered with their budget deﬁcit
ﬁgures before joining the Euro zone provide anecdotal examples. Argentina has been suspected
of understating inﬂation ﬁgures since mid–2007. The Hungarian government, according to its prime
minister in a statement that leaked out, lied to the general public about the state of the economy to win
the elections in 2006. Ukraine misreported the level of reserves to the International Monetary Fund
between 1996 and 1998. China is believed to embellish its GDP growth numbers. Even the United
States came under scrutiny after GDP growth revisions were consistently negative in the crisis that
started in 2008.1 At times governments are caught red-handed (Hungary or Ukraine), but most of the
time it is simply unclear whether the data that are provided to the public are just inaccurate (because
of, say, measurement errors or bad data collection methods) or suffer from deliberate alterations.
In some cases, misinforming economic agents may bring tangible (possibly short-term) gains for a
government; for example, Argentina by misstating inﬂation ﬁgures avoided paying out higher interest
on government bonds indexed to inﬂation (which should have constituted in fact a partial default) and
raising the wages in the public sector. Greece enjoyed lower borrowing rates (close to Germany’s)
on its government debt because of its Euro zone membership and because investors did not know the
entire extent of Greek budget troubles. Given these examples, there are two important questions to
ask. Is it possible to ﬁnd instances when countries or groups of countries engage in misinforming
economic agents? Is there some common characteristic that is shared by these countries?
Inthispaperweuseastatisticaltestbasedonthedistributionofﬁrstdigitsofeconomicaccounting
data (also known as Benford’s Law) to test whether countries falsify the economic ﬁgures that they
report or not. Benford’s distribution of the ﬁrst digits arises naturally for many different types of
data. This is true for processes with exponential growth or products of independent random variables;
that is, in applications, for many economic data due to inﬂation, economic or population growth in
the presence of stochastic shocks. This property is preserved under multiplication by a common
factor, so will survive conversions into different currencies. This distribution arises when data from
many different economic processes (from many countries) are considered together. Deviations from
Benford’s distribution may ﬂag data reporting irregularities.
Our data set. In our tests we use quarterly balance of payments (BoP) data from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for years 1989–2007, for several reasons.2 Firstly, these accounting data are
available for many countries from the same source. Secondly, there were instances where countries
1For Greece’s actions before joining the Euro zone, see The Wall Street Journal (2004). For the more recent account of
releasing dodgy budget statistics, see the Financial Times (2010). For Italy, see the Financial Times (2001). Argentina’s
story is described for example in the Financial Times (2008) and The Wall Street Journal (2008). The Hungarian case is
treated in the Financial Times (2007). Ukraine’s history is described inter alia in IMF (2000). For accounts for China and
the USA see the Financial Times (2009).
2Section 2 details why some other statistical series of interest were not chosen for scrutiny.
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were either caught (Ukraine) or suspected (Russia, The Gambia, China, Chad, Sierra Leone, Egypt
etc.) of misreporting this particular kind of data. Next, the ﬁrst-digits of each BoP entry should by
itselfconformwiththeBenford’sLaw; anditshouldbethemoresowhendatafrommultiplecountries
are considered (when heterogeneity is introduced). Moreover, the data are somewhat standardized
(among countries and across time) as it should be prepared (categorized) by providers according to
an IMF manual. They offer a lot of datapoints relatively to other data on economic fundamentals.
Also, they are not transformed many times (and if the balance is recorded in U.S. dollars it is not
transformed at all), something which could worsen their statistical properties.3 Moreover, as the data
are quarterly, they include series that are closely watched by investors so that countries may have
an incentive to misrepresent them. One would wish naturally to extend our tests to other types of
macroeconomic data; but the size of the task just for the series at hand is already substantial enough.
Detailed methodology. We ﬁrst advance theoretical arguments and review the literature on why the
economic processes of interest should adhere to Benford’s Law. Then, we show that for our entire
dataset we cannot reject a Benford’s distribution of the ﬁrst digits. Before putting our data to a closer
test, we develop a simple model (taking into account the characteristics of our data set) that gives us
insights as to why and when countries would strategically misinform investors (economic agents) on
the series we study. Our story is simple: a country may want to hide its true state of the world to
prevent capital outﬂows or incite inﬂows. Next, we group countries in different relevant categories
indicatedby our modeland investigatewhether wecan rejectthe hypothesisthat thedistribution ofthe
ﬁrst digits of data that they provide complies with Benford’s distribution, which would be indicative
of data manipulation.
Results. Using balance of payments data we ﬁnd evidence that countries with ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes, those with high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances have
economic data that have irregular, non-Benford behavior of the ﬁrst digits. We reject the Benford’s
Law for series from many groups of countries that would be more vulnerable to capital ﬂow reversals
(i.e., those with ﬁxed exchange rates and relatively high capital openness; countries with both current
and ﬁscal deﬁcits). Euro-adopting countries have unusual distributions of ﬁrst digits in the reported
accounts after they join the Euro zone. Our main results do not seem to be driven by including
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or those with low institutional quality ratings in our samples.
Interpretation. As the rejections of the Benford distribution for the ﬁrst digits of data occur for
speciﬁc groups only and not for the complements in the data set (for example for ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes but not ﬂoating ones, or countries with low net foreign assets but not those with high net
foreign assets), our results are consistent with the hypothesis that vulnerable countries (as indicated
by our model) strategically manipulate the data. These rejections are rather category than country
speciﬁc, as data from many countries for different quarters enters different categories. For example,
if a country changes its exchange rate regime or the sign of the current account within the range of
3Nye and Moul (2007) found that economic series transformed many times with imprecise procedures (e.g., relying
on inaccurate exchange rates) may not obey Benford’s Law. They advise to work with the raw, nominal data.








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
our sample, its data will enter different categories for different quarters.4
These rejections of the Benford’s Law should not be driven by some perverse statistical features of
the data. We correct for possible persistence or statistical breaks in the data by developing a speciﬁc
randomization procedure, and develop its critical test values by simulations. We want our rejections
of the null hypothesis to be corroborated both by traditional P-values of chi-square tests, but also with
our developed tests based on selecting a fraction of the data at random that we call 1-in-5, 1-in-10, 1-
in-20 criteria. We group many countries sharing similar economic characteristics together so that data
heterogeneity and shorter time series for more countries in each group are typically considered than
in for example purely a geographical division of countries (we want to have at least 1100 observations
so as to be able to use the 1-in-10 criterion). This should allow for a better adequation to Benford’s
Law for ﬁnite samples (see Section 5.1.2).5 The rejections for some categories (for example, among
ﬁxed vs. ﬂoating division) exist for groups comprising of a larger number of countries than the non-
vulnerable groups, again favoring the strategic argument.
We doubt that the rejection of Benford’s distribution for the ﬁrst digits of the data for many groups
of vulnerable countries according to our model is due to just poor data collection and noise in the data
in those countries. Large positions in the errors and omissions section of the BoP data may indicate,
of course, that the data collection process in a given country is of low quality or that there is a
great amount of illicit or unrecorded transactions; but if there are no manipulations involved, the ﬁrst
digits of the series (even when incompletely registering transactions) should still adhere to Benford’s
Law (see Section C.2.1 in Appendix C). When we look at the tests based on the less persistent
series, there is hardly any evidence that countries with bad institutions do have non-expected ﬁrst-
digit distributions. If the rejection of Benford’s distribution would be caused by bad data collection,
the ﬁrst-digit distribution of the less persistent series should be also affected. Moreover, robustness
checks show that excluding countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or those with low institutional quality
ratings as measured by World Bank WGI indicators, such as government effectiveness or rule of law,
does not change our main conclusions (see Section 6.6).6 Observing various vulnerable categories,
we obtain stronger results for countries with more open capital markets (which tend to be countries
with better data collection metholodogies as well). Also, because we ﬁnd evidence for countries
that would appear (at least in the short run, according to our model) to beneﬁt from misinforming
investors, we do not think that the data suffer from rounding errors; if it were so, we would ﬁnd
rejections of the null hypothesis all across the board. The irregularities may not be caused merely
by regular and expected interventions of authorities; for example if we exclude the item of reserves,
4We do not claim that necessarily all countries belonging to a particular group cause a discrepancy; this may be driven
by few countries only. We control whether exclusion of one country at a time changes our results.
5For example, the subsets of countries that have ﬁxed exchange rate regimes contain many countries (49 countries
with 26.6 quarters on average for the stable sample and 84 countries with 32.6 quarters on average for the full sample) so
that we believe based on Section 5.4.1 that the neither persistence nor structural breaks are driving our results.
6Young (2009) questions the quality of growth or price statistics provided by ofﬁcial sources in Sub-Saharan Africa.
We exclude therefore such countries to show that they do not drive our results.
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which is directly impacted by central banks, we still draw the same conclusions for the ﬁrst digit
distributions of countries grouped by ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange regimes.
Relying on our evidence, which supports our economic model, we conclude that countries, at
times, may falsify economic data strategically when it suits their interest. This calls for the inclusion
of strategic information provision by governments in models where public signals are important.
Caveats on the practicality of our method. Unfortunately, due to data limitation of macroeconomic
series (too few points per each series) our methods do not allow us to detect which country at what
point provided false information. We do not know how grave the possible infractions were. Moreover,
we cannot exclude that some of the observed effects would be just price tag effects, though the latter
are likely to appear rather in nominal currency rather than in U.S. dollars. For example, a country
might report instead of a deﬁcit on the trade balance of 2.01 billion in a local currency a one that is
slightly lower, say at 1.99 billion. Our task is complicated by the fact that countries may not cheat
all of the time (as serial cheaters might be found out quickly); detecting fraud in one or two quarters
when many quarters of the data are present is then unlikely. Out of necessity, we are also working
with data that are sometimes revised and sent to the IMF several quarters after initial revelation. The
tests cannot detect also some instances of cheating – for example if a country changes all its items by a
common factor or if it changes the numbers preserving the Benford’s ﬁrst-digit distribution. It is also
hard to envisage which digit would be favored in any potential infractions; this is because investors
may possess some information of their own and the country may not stray too far away from either
past values or investor expectations in order to appear credible in its announcements.
Literature review. The tests we employ are used by accounting practitioners to detect fraud in
company accounts (see Nigrini [1999] for examples). Varian (1972) suggested to use Benford’s Law
totestthenaturalnessofthedataandadequacyofthenumbersproducedbyforecastingmodels. These
tests were not used widely up to date in international (macroeconomic) comparisons; there is typically
a lack of enough suitable data to boost the statistical power of such tests that render these methods
impractical and until recently (for example at the time of writing of Varian [1972]) the theoretical
processes generating this distribution were not well understood.
To our knowledge, there are two studies that use Benford’s distribution to inspect macroeconomic
data so far. Nye and Moul (2007) provide evidence (and also simulations of economic quantities)
that widely used international macroeconomic data such as the GDP series in the Penn World Tables
exhibits ﬁrst digits that do in general conform to Benford’s distribution. The data, however, do not
conform to Benford’s Law for non-OECD countries, posing questions about data quality; the alter-
ation of data might come from the source (falsiﬁcation or simply from an inefﬁcient data collection
infrastructure in the considered countries) or from inaccurate data transformations. Gonzalez-Garcia
and Pastor (2009) follow a similar exercise and extend the analysis to annual IMF data. Their main
conclusions are threefold. First, they ﬁnd that most macroeconomic series they study follow Ben-
ford’s Law. Second, after observing some series for individual countries – GDP for Finland and
Japan – they claim that “structural breaks” in the data may lead to a failure of Benford’s Law to hold
in practice (as they work with a small number of observations) for countries that according to the IMF
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possess a high quality of data.7 Third, and most interestingly, they ﬁnd no convincing link between
independent assessments of data quality collection methods in country groups and the rejections of
Benford’s Law for the ﬁrst digits of data, which may be consistent with our story. None of these pa-
pers, however, provides a model why countries would misreport data and do it strategically. The focus
of these two papers is about assessing the quality of data used in empirical work. In these two studies
countries are grouped based on geographical criteria, which in fact may be vacuous – why should all
African countries be lumped together? – whereas we use groupings based on relevant economic crite-
ria, which allows to draw some conclusions on category-speciﬁc behavior. Our groupings also should
have more data heterogeneity as we consider shorter time series for more countries in each group
rather than in a purely geographical division of countries. This should allow for a better adequation to
Benford’s Law for ﬁnite samples (see Section 5.1.2). It also appears that the indicated references do
not correct for the possible persistence or structural breaks of the economic series, which could lead to
false rejections of the conformity of the realized ﬁrst-digit distribution with Benford’s Law, while we
address this issue (Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor [2009] only notice the possibility of structural breaks
for single series). We sidestep these issues by aggregating data across many countries and using a
procedure to select the series at different dates to be tested randomly (see Section 5.4 for details).
From the existing literature it is clear that the public signal is important for economic agents. The
research on countries’ truthfulness in information provision, however, is meagre to date. The problem
is that economic agents cannot readily verify whether the information issued by a government is of
low quality (i.e., imprecise) or whether the government in question is supplying deliberately false
information.8 Each government or statistical authority has some leeway in providing the various
numbers describing the state of the economy as long as these are not too far off from the public
expectations; and as long as these can be subsequently put in the errors or omissions sections. Related
to our topic is the literature on public signals and transparency under strategic uncertainty recently
represented inter alia by Morris and Shin (2002) or Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and explicitly in the
contextof acurrency attackby HeinemannandIlling (2002). However, thenotionof strategicinvestor
misinformation has not been considered in this literature to our knowledge; a central authority can
control at best the precision (the variance) of the public signal that the investors get, which is not the
same as what we mean here.9 Note, however, that changing the precision of the signal would not
constitute data manipulation and our tests would not pick it up, as the data that would be generated
should still then adhere to Benford’s Law (see the arguments in Section 5.1 below). Angeletos et al.
7This qualiﬁcation is important; the presence of structural breaks in the data may be due to changes in data collection
methodology and exactly a way to blur the measurement of some economic quantities. The discussions about the accuracy
of measures of unemployment or the budget deﬁcit under different methodologies are perennial.
8Institutions like the IMF or the Eurostat can verify at least partially the information that is given out by the country,
but this does not solve the problem in its entirety.
9A different notion is that of vagueness, when a policymaker would release a set of signals containing the true one to
be informative in the equilibrium; see Stein (1989) based on the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Gelos and Wei
(2005) show empirically that funds invest less in less transparent countries.
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(2006) and Tarashev (2007) offer models where the government chooses a signal (the interest rate) to
inform the public about the state of its economy. This affects the cost of the agent’s later decision.
But providing false information is a different issue; the agents may not know well the information
policy of the government and (provided that the agents do pay attention to what the government
says) this information may affect the belief formation in one way or the other. Extending the work
of Obstfeld (1986) and Obstfeld (1996) and analyzing a second generation currency crisis model
without any strategic uncertainty, Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) note (without modeling the strategic
choices of a central authority) that a greater precision of public information may stop an otherwise
imminent attack when the state of the economy is bad and that the contrary is true when the state
is good. This opens up the question whether the government would like to use the information that
is provided to its advantage. On a different note, Sandleris (2008) argues that a country may repay
sovereign debt in order not to reveal bad information about the state of its economy. The literature
on the strategic delay of information release is related but does not apply here. The large literature
on dynamic inconsistency and limited commitment started by Kydland and Prescott (1977) is not
relevant in this context; and neither is the literature on moral hazard with ex-post veriﬁable actions.
Successful misinformation by a government may seem puzzling and is rarely taken into account,
as it appears at odds with the assumptions of rational expectations and the economic agents’ knowl-
edge about the true state of the world employed in many models.10 In some models with strategic un-
certainty, information is aggregated through individual trades into prices; and hence the governments’
inﬂuence over the information known to market participants may be extremely limited. This, how-
ever, may be not true all the time; for example in a ﬁxed exchange regime where an important price
– the exchange rate – is ﬁxed, the shadow price (the real exchange rate) must be calculated based on
the statistics provided by governments. A fundamental question is why individuals (knowing that the
government may reveal information strategically) would pay attention to public signals at all. How-
ever the basic conclusions of the literature on one-sided private information when signalling is not
possible (see for example Aumann et al. [1995], Crawford and Sobel [1982] or Benabou and Laroque
[1992]) are that this can be the case, and partial information revelation may be an equilibrium. An-
other question is whether the ability of governments to provide false information is permanent or just
temporary; in the long run serial cheaters may be found out. This paper, by providing some evidence
on the strategic character of government release of public signals, provides an incentive to continue
and expand theoretical research in these ﬁelds.
Organization of the paper. The paper is constructed as follows. First, we discuss the choice of
our data set and then the reasons for which countries would want to misreport economic data; in
Section 3 we lay out a model of ﬁnancial ﬂows and of country incentives to misinform investors
10The Billion Prices Project by Alberto Cavallo and Roberto Rigobon is an initiative by private agents to gather infor-
mation in lieu of government agencies (in this case on the evolution of prices). This way of substituting the government,
however, is limited by what can be observed by economic agents themselves. In the case of the balance of payments or
gross domestic product data, a similar project is hard to envisage.
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about their state of the economy. Then in Section 4 we describe the data we use while in Section 5 we
discuss the theory behind Benford’s Law and the statistical methodology for our dataset. Section 6
reports the evidence and Section 7 concludes. Proofs, tables with statistical documentation and main
results ofour studyare includedin the Appendix. Other material(extended proofs, full sampleresults,
robustness checks, etc.) is in Appendix C.
2 Choice of a convenient data set
We ﬁrst choose a data set that would make detecting misreporting (if any occurs at all) possible given
our methodology. We seek economic series which could be manipulated by the government and at the
same time easily observed by investors. The indicators in question should also theoretically follow
Benford’s Law. For our tests to have rejection power (see Section 5) we require a lot of comparable
data. Certain other characteristics are also desirable for a data set to be adequate (explained below).
For theoretical reasons, we do not expect inﬂation, interest rates, the ﬁscal deﬁcit (as a percent-
age of the GDP) nor any indicators that are growth rates with some time-invariant expectation (GDP
growth, changes in industrial production) to follow Benford’s Law by property P1 (see Section 5), and
it might be difﬁcult to obtain enough heterogeneity so that property P2 works. In contrast, we expect
that money supply, public debt (stock), budgetary entries (data in levels), output (level data) and bal-
ance of payments entries should follow the said law. Taking data from many countries (distributions)
should increase adherence to the Benford’s Law by property P2 (Section 5).
There are few statistics for GDP or industrial production available for each quarter for a wide
range of countries and some of these are available only yearly (i.e., ﬁscal data). Comparable public
sectordebtdataformostofthecoveredcountriesinthePublicSectorDebtStatisticsdatabasefromthe
World Bank/IMF are available only since 2009. For external debt in the World Bank/IMF Quarterly
External Debt Statistics, more extensive quarterly coverage for countries starts with 2003-2005.11
With a small number of observations in the data sets, it is difﬁcult to group countries according to
their economic characteristics and reduce persistence by considering randomly selected subsets.
A different issue is whether the data are measured (i.e., as a ﬂow) or artiﬁcially constructed (as
an index).12 Industrial production and price levels are indices, so are not “natural” data. On the other
hand, geometrically increasing sequences – like the BoP entries, ﬁscal data etc. – are convenient and
guarantee on a theoretical side the conformity to Benford’s Law. Ideally, we would like measures
that are calculated using similar methodologies from country to country and that do not involve many
transformations of the data. Moreover, some macroeconomic data are only one of a kind data, and so
do not comprise comprehensive accounting data sets. Finally, possible persistence in the series may
11The troubling lack of availability (with speculations why such transparency could be caused by) of precise debt data
even historically is highlighted for example by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), page 137.
12Nye and Moul (2007) advise against using indices for testing the adequation to Benford’s Law. Statistical method-
ologies used in constructing such indices and for example seasonal adjustment may worsen the “naturalness” of the data.
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make the rejection of the Benford’s Law easier.
Data sets on the balance of payments, ﬁscal data and money supply satisfy most of these require-
ments. We chose to investigate quarterly balance of payments data from the IMF BOPS database13
for the period 1989–2007, as they had some additional advantages over other data sets.14 Available
quarterly, these are accounting data containing net values, which helps counter the problem of per-
sistence that could lead to easier rejections of the Benford distribution for the ﬁrst digits in ﬁnite
samples (see Section 5.4). These data are provided by statistical agencies of IMF member states and
should be prepared in a standard way, using the Balance of Payments manual of the IMF (1993). The
data are in U.S. dollars, which means that they were minimally transformed (for the importance of
this, Nye and Moul [2007]) given the fact that most international transactions are conducted in this
currency. Moreover, many countries keep track of the BoP in U.S. dollars (e.g., Poland, Romania,
Taiwan, etc.). The fact that the BoP data are converted to U.S. dollars should preserve the Benford’s
distribution of the digits if the original distribution indeed is Benford (Section 5.1.3) but the distribu-
tion would remain non-Benford if it were such initially. Currency conversion may also help to avoid
some structural breaks like currency reforms, hyperinﬂations or rapid disinﬂation that would appear
in the domestic-currency data.
Why would countries manipulate the BoP data? BoP data is crucial for ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes and for countries with high net foreign liabilities. In a ﬁxed exchange regime, the value
of the information coming from the BoP is even higher to agents as the exchange rate (which would
otherwise contain aggregate information about the underlying transactions) in a credible regime is
expected not to change. A sustained current account imbalance may point to a misalignment of the
real exchange rate that may be (abruptly) corrected by a devaluation or depreciation of the country’s
currency. A depletion of reserves without a possibility of borrowing liquidity may lead to a balance
of payments crisis as in the literature started by Krugman (1979) or to a currency attack. Moreover,
investors obtain valuable information from the BoP that helps them assessing the returns to capital
(and their riskiness) within the country in the nearest future.15 For example, changes in reserves, or
changes in the volume and composition of the current account items have implications for the ability
to retire capital (for possible capital ﬂow restrictions in the future), for the probability of a successful
speculative attack (that would diminish the valuation of the assets held in the local currency), or for
13The data was accessed online at the IMF website on 31 December 2009.
14In further work, we analyze various ﬁscal data sets to uncover patterns of rejection of the Benford’s Law. Most ﬁscal
data sets contain yearly data which leads to relatively few datapoints available for a wide set of countries.
15For example, Standard and Poor’s (2008) analyzes the structure of the current account, the composition of capital
ﬂows and reserve adequacy to assess a sovereign’s rating. They use indices composed of different items of the BoP
(balance on trade, FDI, portfolio ﬂows, reserves, etc.) in their assessments. Imperfect as it may be, the sets of indicators
published in economic press outlets may be telling what draws most attention. For example, in The Economist, the set of
indices covered on a regular basis include: GDP change (%), industrial production change (%), consumer prices change
(%), unemployment rate (%), trade balance (ﬂow), current account (ﬂow and % of GDP), budget balance (% of GDP)
and interest rates (%). In the IMF World Economic Outlook issues, the main indicators include output, inﬂation, ﬁscal
balances, trade volumes and prices, current account, capital and ﬁnancial account transactions.
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the solvency (or possible illiquidity) of the country and the ﬁrms located there and potential macroe-
conomic adjustment needed in case of a rapid correction of any current account imbalances. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) include among the best few predictors of banking and/or currency crashes (compil-
ing from the rich literature on early crisis indicators), respectively, the short-term capital inﬂows/GDP,
current account balance/investment, current account balance/GDP, and exports. In the view of this, a
government may want to lie on the BoP data for example to steer the market expectations to a good
equilibrium (as in second generation currency crisis models), avoid capital ﬂight or attract investment
to cover a current account or a ﬁscal deﬁcit.
There are several instances where countries were suspected of changing their BoP entries or out-
right caught doing so.16 Russia and Gambia were charged of being guilty of overstating reserves with
Ukraine (see IMF [2000]) being the most blatant case. Chad and Sierra Leone were not disclosing
external arrears that they ran in breach of the agreements with the IMF. China was accused of un-
derstating its trade surpluses. Analysts and commentators point in several cases to doubts about the
veracity and accuracy of data (i.e., Egypt in 2005 but many other instances can be found) when the
sizes of the net errors and omissions may seriously alter the current account balance shown by a coun-
try (for example, putting it into a negative territory). All these cases, except for China (the country
is not in the IFS data for 1989–2007), are found in countries that were at the time of the accusations
dependent on capital ﬂows or international aid.
In the next section we develop a parsimonious stylized model where countries reveal information
strategically to investors, trying to inﬂuence capital ﬂows. The implications of this model are used to
group countries for testing misreporting.
3 Misreportingeconomicdatatointernationalinvestors: amodel
To motivate our empirical tests, we provide a parsimonious open economy model where we study
the incentives of countries to provide false information to investors. We study a one shot game of
incomplete information. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Suppose ﬁrst there is a continuum
of identical countries indexed i 2 [0;1] with a population of immobile workers Li  1 and endowed
with immobile capital installed Ci C > 0. There are in total K units of mobile capital in the world;
for simplicity these are owned by some agents which have no domicile, but have to invest this capital
in at least one of the aforementioned countries. There are free capital ﬂows between all countries, and
perfectly competitive markets for the factors of production within each country. The remuneration of
factors equals their marginal productivity.
To model a country’s incentives, suppose that the news about each country’s balance of payments
data can be either Good (g) or Bad (b) reﬂecting the underlying state of a country’s economy17; for
16For Russia: Financial Times (1999), for China: Financial Times (2003). For Chad, Gambia and Sierra Leone see the
IMF press releases from 2003, 2005 and 2006 respectively. Doubts about Egypt’s ﬁgures in Reuters News (2005).
17The model is stylized. The application to BoP data can be understood that good or bad data about the BoP will in-








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
each country i 2 [0;1], we denote its state by si 2 fg;bg. The state of the economy is modeled as
a multiplicative productivity parameter and denoting by A a common parameter for all countries,
one has A(g) > A(b). Each country has the same technology and the statistical process generating a
periods’ news, as well as F > 0, the present discounted value of punishment for being caught lying.18
There is only one period. For all countries, a Good state occurs with a common probability ˆ r,
which is drawn from some distribution r on [0;1]. Since there is a continuum of countries, this
results, by the law of large numbers, in respective fractions ˆ r and 1  ˆ r of the countries being in Good
and Bad states. The distribution r is common knowledge but the actual probability ˆ r of a Good state
is initially unknown to the countries and investors. The sequence of moves is the following. Each
country i 2 [0;1] learns its own true state of productivity si 2 fg;bg and then declares it (truthfully
or not) as di 2 fg;bg to investors simultaneously with other countries; we denote by ˜ r the fraction of
countries declaring a Good state. Investors observe country declarations, and then make decisions on
where and how much to invest: we denote by Ki(di; ˜ r) the total capital invested in country i (including
the immobile capital C). Then, the period ends, investments are realized and the payouts (including
punishments, if any) are made.
We assume that the production function in country i,
Yi = A(si) F
 








is Cobb–Douglas with the capital intensity 0 < a < 1. As Li = 1 for all countries i, we do not





be its expectation (with respect to the distribution r). We assume that each country i
cares about its gross national product (the remuneration of domestic factors), Ri = wiLi+riCi where
wi is the wage and ri is the return to (domestically installed and owned) capital. With the above
assumption on the production function, this translates into











Country i’s payoff is increasing in the state of the world si and in the installed (immobile) capitalC.
We discuss only an equilibrium when a fraction of countries always lies, but investors analyze the
declarations, obtain information from these and make rational investment decisions nevertheless.19
In this equilibrium, countries that receive a Good state si = g report truthfully g; a fraction j 2
crease/decrease potential ﬂows if declared truthfully by a country, and the country desires (given the production functions
and its objective to maximize GNP) to attract as many ﬂows as possible. Good data about the BoP may mean that a
country is less risky and offers higher returns to potential investors given the same level of ﬂows.
18This punishment may not occur with certainty; in reality it may be very difﬁcult for investors collectively to learn
that a country misstated its information.
19The “babbling” equilibrium, as in games of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel [1982]), where countries randomize their
declarations and investors ignore the messages sent by countries does not exist here. This is because there is a positive
punishment F, so countries that would randomly lie would be punished: lying has consequences.
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[0;1] of countries that receive a Bad state si = b declare a Good state g knowing that they will obtain
in expectations a penalty F; while the rest of those receiving the Bad state (1 j) declare it as
such. As we show in Proposition 6 (in the Appendix), at equilibrium, the investors deduce j from
the knowledge of F. Since in addition countries’ strategies do not depend on ˆ r, which is unknown
to them when making the declarations, one has that ˜ r = ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r) and investors learn the true ˆ r
from observing ˜ r. Investors wish to maximize their ex-ante return from investment (this will be the
characteristic of any equilibrium), hence they will allocate capital K so that the marginal return from
investment in countries declaring a Good or Bad state of the world is equalized: at equilibrium, the
invested capital Ki(g; ˜ r) and Ki(b; ˜ r) do not depend on the countries i (given thatCi C for all i) and
















Existence of this equilibrium is shown in the Appendix. When F is high enough, all countries always
make a truthful declaration about the state of their productivity and j = 0.
Proposition 6 (stated in the Appendix) guarantees the existence of a one-to-one mapping j 2
(0;1) 7! F and the following result indicates that this mapping (and its inverse) are decreasing: the
weaker the punishment, the more countries lie.
Proposition 1. The fraction j 2 (0;1) of liars at equilibrium strictly increases as the punishment F
decreases.
In the analyzed equilibrium, investors make their decisions rationally; there is some information
transmission between countries and the investors; and some fraction of countries is lying about their
state of the world.
We now perform some comparative statics and interpret the implications of the model for the data.
We shall use the implications stemming from these propositions to partition countries into different
groups that should display different behavior in manipulating (or not) their messages.
Proposition 1 does not handle the case if there were different groups of countries with different
levels of punishment (the size of which is common knowledge). Investors would view differently
each group of countries, but still they would want to equalize the ex-ante return to capital on both
groups. Suppose there are two groups21 that vary in the punishment costs of misreporting, that are
respectively denoted by F < F.
Proposition 2. Countries in the group with the lower punishment cost F have a higher fraction of
liars at equilibrium.
20We assume that the endowments of capital Ci are such that even when being in the Bad state b each country would
receive some international ﬂows.
21The arguments in Propositions 2–4 can be extended to countably many different groups.








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
Let Q be the cost of abandoning a ﬁxed currency regime for country i if the period capital ﬂows
were low after the country truthfully declared si = b. This means, ceteris paribus, given a penalty F,
that the effective penalty for misreporting for such a country is lower when the true state is si = b.
Hence, the above proposition shows that if the countries have the same level of installed capital C a
country with a ﬁxed exchange rate would more likely provide false information than a country with
a more ﬂexible currency arrangement if they had the same openness to capital ﬂows. Also, if some
countries are facing higher punishments because of their previous misreporting or sovereign defaults,
Proposition 2 tells us they would be less likely to misrepresent their statistics.
We now show that countries with less installed capital (lower Ci) and therefore relying more on
foreign investment will have higher incentives to lie. For the clarity of exposition we again assume
that there are only two groups of countries, with respective installed capitalsC <C.
Proposition 3. Countries in the group with the lower installed capital C have a higher fraction of
liars at equilibrium.
When we turn to data, we will interpret the last observations in the following way. Countries with
high negative asset positions (i.e., relying strongly on foreign capital), having a need of ﬁnancing
their negative current account and/or a ﬁscal deﬁcit and at the same time open to capital ﬂows should
have higher incentives to misreport their true state of the economy.
In what we assumed so far, capital ﬂows were unrestricted for the mobile international capital.
Suppose now that there are barriers to capital ﬂows to some countries, so that only a fraction t < 1 of
any investment is obtained ex-post. Then, ceteris paribus, a country with no barriers will have higher
incentives to misinform investors in the Bad state of the world as the resulting relative capital ﬂows
(when claiming the Good vs. the Bad state) will be more important.
Proposition 4. Countries with lower barriers to capital ﬂows have a higher fraction of liars at equi-
librium.
When the economic state of the world (realized ˆ r) is lower than the expectation of r, the fraction
of liars among all countries is higher.
Proposition 5. The lower the ˆ r, the more countries are lying.
This may not be the necessarily true during all “crisis” years when the fraction of countries re-
ceiving a Bad state of productivity is high, if such an outcome was expected.
Punishments (possible extensions). We assumed that the punishment F is constant and that the
interaction is one shot only. A more complex model could be delivered; for example, investors may
punish a country that lied by not investing in it in the future for at least some time. We chose not
to model such an interaction, as in repeated games, there are many punishment structures that could
sustain different equilibria; which one would be used by investors is an empirical question which was
not resolved even in the oft-studied sovereign-debt literature. We also did not do it for parsimony.
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Benabou and Laroque (1992) provide a model with the stage game with similar features to ours
(though with players’ payoff functions that are easier to analyze)22 where many different equilibria
with repeated interaction are characterized depending on the initial assumptions.
4 Data
For our BOPS data set, the initial date of 1989 is chosen because prior to that year the data are
available for few countries and international capital ﬂows were then relatively small; after 1989 many
newcountriesemergethatstartprovidingstatistics. Weusequarterlydatathatinvestorsoftentakeinto
account while making their decisions. Yearly data occurs with a lag and may not be as informative
(so may not be actively falsiﬁed); moreover we would get four times fewer datapoints. Monthly data
are available only for a few countries on a regular basis.
We take all the net ﬁgures from the BoP so as to lower the problem of persistence.23 We consider
this to be an innocuous but a helpful ﬁx. Net values like the current or ﬁnancial account balances
are given by many countries to investors before any gross items are available. Theoretically (see
Section 5.1.1), a difference of almost all two exponential sequences (so, net values) will also have a
Benford behavior of the ﬁrst digits. We consider all entries (also Net Errors and Omissions); as the
BoP items should sum up to zero, a typical manipulation would require changing at least two series.
Net Errors and Omissions is an item that can be inﬂated to hide unfavorable current account data
(Reuters News, 2005). All in all, we have at maximum 13 entries24 per country for each quarter, so
with 76 quarters of data – at a maximum 988 observations for each country. More detailed statistics
for the BoP are not available for a large set of countries and often come with a considerable lag.25
We have data for 103 countries for the period 1989–2007 with 69287 observations on the ﬁrst
digits. As the maximum number of observations is then 101764 (103 countries with 13 items reported
over 76 quarters), there is a considerable number of missing observations. Many of these missing
values appear not to be random, stemming from the fact that countries did not report all BoP entries
(especially those that were small) for several consecutive quarters (or at all) at the beginning of the
studied period, but started doing so regularly with time. In the ﬁrst quarter of 1989, we have 517
observations while for the last quarter of 2007 – 1167 of them. An example of an entry that has this
pattern is “Financial Derivatives: net” with only 3 countries reporting it in the ﬁrst quarter of 1989
22These authors studied a problem of an informed agent which, except for passing her private information to other
noninformed traders can trade on this information herself. The game studied there is a game of cheap talk when regarded
as a one-stage game, and then a repeated game analysis is provided.
23Some items, like Net Errors and Omissions or for many countries Capital Account: net are only reported in net values.
24Theseare: CurrentAccount: net; Goods: net; Services: net; Income: net; Currenttransfers: net; CapitalAccount: net;
Financial Account: net; Direct Investment: net; Portfolio Investment: net; Other Investment: net; Financial Derivatives:
net; Reserve Assets: net; Net Errors and Omissions. We have not investigated any non-net series.
25We do not use the data supplied directly to investors in real time, but what is given to the IMF with some lag.
Nevertheless, the IMF is an important lending institution which has an inﬂuence on the ﬁnancial conditions in many,
especially non-OECD, countries. The data submitted to the IMF are also used by market participants in their analyzes.
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and 45 countries in the last quarter of 2007. We ﬁnd 32456 missing observations that are missing in
consecutive quarters (so that only 21 of the missing observations occur in 1 quarter only). Among
them, we lose at least 4628 observations only due to the fact that 24 countries were created within
the sample period so obviously could not report the data prior to their independence (and possibly for
some years afterwards). Although some countries report the data for few years or few quarters only
with breaks for unknown reasons, we do not consider the missing observations as a major obstacle.
Even if some countries may have not reported data for strategic motives (which we cannot outrule)
this would work against our method of detecting irregular behavior.
We also use a subset of the data containing only the countries reporting BoP data for at least one
quarter and one series a year between 1995 and 2007, keeping only the observations corresponding to
the latter period of time. This subset will be referred to as the stable sample while the notion of the full
sample will refer to the whole data set. We inspect this sample for the following reasons. The stable
sample is a more complete data set with 66 countries between 1995–2007 with 41245 observations
out of 44616 all possible values.26 Some additional data that we use to provide conditions for slicing
the samples (country investment positions, WGI, etc.) are available for this later period. When
we scrutinize yearly data only, the number of observations per year remains roughly constant. The
countriesincludedthereinmayalsoprovidehigherqualitydata. Forexample, Polandisexcludedfrom
this sample as it did not report the data between 1996–2000 when it was changing and improving the
statistical methodology of BoP reporting. The stable sample is thus our preferred one.
To categorize countries according to their international investment position, we use the updated
and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The exchange rate regimes were classiﬁed based on information of the IMF
in various issues of the “Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions” (IMF
[1989–2008]) and the data provided by the Fund staff themselves. We opted for the de facto classiﬁ-
cations of the IMF. What matters for us is the end-of-period (quarter) status of the regime. Data for
ﬁscal balances was taken from the IMF. Data for institutional quality measures were taken from the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) database (Kaufmann et al. [2009]) while those
for country ratings from the Institutional Investor.
The basic characteristics of the variables in the full and stable samples do not differ substantially
(TableII). Themajorexceptionisintheexchangerateregimes: ahigherfractionoftheobservationsis
available for the purely ﬂoating regimes in the stable sample than in the full sample (36:3% vs. 28:2%
respectively) and a lower fraction for ﬁxed exchange rate regimes (37:5% vs. 45:8% respectively).
The countries in the stable sample have on average slightly higher liabilities but higher net foreign
assets and better institutional rankings.
26Choosing 1994 as the initial year would give us only 61 countries with more incomplete data, while picking 1996
would only raise the number of countries in the sample to 70. In both cases the alternative choice would lead to fewer
observations being included in the stable sample. As we need as many countries and quarters as possible given the
arguments advanced in Section 5, the choice of the 1995–2007 sample is a natural one.
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5 The balance of payments data and Benford’s Law
We ﬁrst recall why the numbers contained in the BoP data should theoretically follow a speciﬁc
distribution called Benford’s Law and then show that this is empirically the case.
5.1 Benford’s Law and its properties for macroeconomic data
Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938) independently observed empirically and described a distribu-
tion of numbers called since the Benford’s Law. The predicted occurrences of the ﬁrst27 digits are
given, for all j 2 f1;:::;9g, by qj = log10(1+1=j); the values of these frequencies qj are given in
Table I and are plotted in the top left graph of Figure 1.
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
qj 30:1% 17:6% 12:5% 9:7% 7:9% 6:7% 5:8% 5:1% 4:6%
Table I: Benford’s Law (q1;:::;q9) for the ﬁrst digits.
To date, we know of one property and two families of processes that lead the data to be distributed
according to Benford’s Law. These are processes with exponential growth and variations around
them (differences of such processes and/or random exponential growths); taking random samples of
random distributions; and scale-invariant (unit-invariant) processes. We label these properties P1, P2,
and P3 and this is how we refer to them in the remainder of the text.
WeﬁrstprovideabriefoverviewoftheclassesofprocessesthatleadtoBenford’sLaw; mathemat-
ical details and further references may be found in Section C.2.1 in Appendix C. The applicability
of the Benford’s Law to macroeconomic data was already discussed in Nye and Moul (2007) or
Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor (2009), based on the mentioned properties P1–P3 and on the properties
of artiﬁcially generated sequences.
5.1.1 P1—Processes with exponential growth
The simplest generating model is formed by (deterministic) geometric sequences fa; a2; :::; ang with
ratio a such that log10a is irrational28; they lead to sets of data that conform more and more closely
to Benford’s Law as n grows (Diaconis [1977]). Almost all geometric sequences lead to Benford’s
Law as the set of rational numbers has a null measure within the set of all real numbers. This implies
27Benford’s Law also describes the frequencies of occurrences of the next digits, which we do not use here for the lack
of a sufﬁcient number of observations.
28Otherwise the sequence of the ﬁrst digits is cyclic and has asymptotic proportions that are rational and thus are
different from the ones of Benford’s Law; consider the simple example when log10a = 2=3, in which case the sequence
is 102k=3 and contains only elements with ﬁrst digits equal to the ﬁrst digits of 102=3, 104=3, and 100, that is, 4, 2, 1; the
asymptotic repartition of the ﬁrst digits is uniform between these three numbers.
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that in practice all geometric sequences linked to real data lead the data to obey Benford’s Law.
This result extends to differences of such geometric processes: for given ratios a and b (such that
log10a is irrational) and any real numbers a and b, the sets

aa bb; aa2  bb2; :::; aan  bbn	
conform more and more closely to Benford’s Law as n grows (Lemma 2.4 in Kaynar et al. [2010]).
Finally, all these deterministic results extend to certain sequences of random variables (Xj) and (Yj),
with the respective replacement in the expressions above of at and bt by X1X2 ::: Xt and Y1Y2 :::Yt.
The sequences (Xj) and (Yj) can be formed, for instance, by independent and identically distributed
random variables each having a common characteristic function j such that j(2pk)6=1 for all natural
integers k 6= 0; this condition is satisﬁed for almost all distributions. Many other extensions and
relaxations of the condition of independence and/or identical distribution exist.29
Given this, we may consider macroeconomic statistics that are obtained in some multiplicative
way; due to economic, population or price growth, such multiplicative sequences of macroeconomic
statistics for a given country should, if observed for a long enough time, result in a collection of
numbers with the distribution of ﬁrst digits abiding Benford’s Law. For instance, the series of nominal
GDP (exports, FDI ﬂows, etc.) ﬁgures can be considered – but not the series of the GDP (exports,
FDI ﬂows, etc.) growth rates, since the latter correspond to realizations of random variables Xj above.
For example, in a stationary economy with constant real GDP (exports, FDI ﬂows, etc.)30, this should
be the case if long enough time-series are considered when the inﬂation in each period is, e.g., drawn
from a log-normal distribution with a given mean, say 1, and a constant small variance.
These results extend to net values: the difference of multiplicative sequences of macroeconomic
statistics each as exports or imports (the trade balance) would generate Benford behavior of the ﬁrst
digits. In the same way, mismeasurement – for example consistent underreporting of some quantities
– will still lead to Benford sequences as long as the nonmeasured part (i.e., illicit trade) can be
represented by sequences discussed above. Various extensions can be modeled as special cases of the
multiplicative form discussed above, including the case of structural breaks (that could be associated
with deep economic crises or large shocks) and/or the presence of errors in data collection.31
5.1.2 P2—Random samples of random distributions
Hill (1995b) considered the case of data sets with numbers chosen at random according to a two-
step procedure choosing ﬁrst at random a distribution over the positive real numbers, then, drawing
29See Section C.2.1 in Appendix C for an overview of some recent results.
30This will be also true not only in an economy with (zero on nonzero) GDP growth but even with stochastically varying
real GDP, as long as the increases or variations can be modeled as the result of successive multiplications by independent
and identically distributed random variables.
31Suppose that each period a break can occur independently from the past with a constant (small) probability. In this
case, the Xj are given by a two-step randomization, the ﬁrst step determining whether a break occurs and the second one
providing the adequate multiplicative factor, drawn at random according to a distribution depending on the regime. The
same two-step modeling can be applied in the presence of errors in data collection: if the errors can be described in some
random multiplicative manner, the obtained sequences will obey Benford’s Law.








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
k numbers according to it, and ﬁnally repeating the whole procedure a large number n of times; he
provided natural conditions on the distribution of the random probability distribution for Benford’s
Law to occur when n grows. Janvresse and de la Rue (2004) showed that it sufﬁces to consider
random probability distributions taking values in the family of uniform distributions over intervals.
This means that data coming from many different distributions are much more likely to conform
to Benford’s Law (as observed by Benford himself). Aggregating macroeconomic data of several
countries preserves the conformity to Benford’s Law — and even should increase it; this is important
to remember especially when the number of data points per country is too small (i.e., the series are
too short or/and when breaks occur) for property P1 to lead to the conformity to Benford’s Law per
se. Property P2 works best when the measured quantities differ in scales that may arise naturally for
example in terms of the country size. It should work well for our BoP data set, as the scale of the
items on the BoP balances clearly is determined by the size of the economy in question. It could lead
for example for price levels to converge to Benford’s Law, especially if they do not all start at the
same initial value (for example, indices with different base years for each country are preferred).
5.1.3 P3—Scale invariance
Pinkham (1961) and Hill (1995a) proved that Benford’s Law was the unique law such that the dis-
tribution of the ﬁrst digits of numbers drawn at random according to it was stable when the drawn
numbers are multiplied by a common multiplicative factor.
This means that the distribution of ﬁrst digits according to Benford’s Law is preserved even if data
for a country was provided in home currency and then converted into U.S. dollars (which is the case
for the BoP data). The multiplicative factors used to proceed to these conversions are random and
change with time; however, since we are interested in quantities that can be written in multiplicative
forms, the impact of the conversion into U.S. dollars (i.e., the value of the exchange rate) can be
encompassed in the sequence of the Xj, which should thus describe the multiplicative evolution of
the quantity of interest as well as the one of the exchange rate. This way a conversion of a sequence
adhering to Benford’s Law in one currency to another should lead to a Benford sequence.
5.1.4 More on the applicability to macroeconomic data
The most thorough study of conformity to Benford’s Law of data in macroeconomics to date is Nye
and Moul (2007). They showed through simulations that long enough sequences of nominal GDPs
for a set of ﬁctitious countries formed sequences of numbers whose ﬁrst digits obey Benford’s Law,
provided that the random economic factors (various growth rates) were set in a proper way. They then
illustrated on the Penn World Tables dataset that some subgroups of countries (OECD countries on
the one hand, African countries on the other) are such that the data set obtained by aggregating their
GDP data conformed to Benford’s Law. They also argued that various transformations of nominal
data (inﬂation adjustments, creation of purchasing power indices, etc.) may alter its quality and lead
to sets of numbers not conforming anymore to Benford’s Law. They used the Benford’s Law as a test








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
of naturalness of the data, as is the case in other ﬁelds, e.g., accounting. They conclude that “broadly
speaking, country GDP ﬁgures should be consistent with Benford’s distribution when countries are
heterogeneous in their initial levels (e.g., population, per-capita income, etc.) and then grow.”
Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor (2009) based on the same IFS data set as ours ﬁnd that in general
data conforms to Benford’s Law when countries are grouped based on geographical criteria; they in
particular consider also the same BoP data set as us with entries transformed into U.S. dollars. They
point out that the obtained conformities are hardly related to measures of the quality of the data (as
indicated by independent experts) and also explain the atypical behavior of series for some countries
by structural breaks. Their tests are however based on annual observations and use fewer data points
as we do, thus probably not being able to ensure that n is large enough when calling for property P1.
In addition, they do not correct for the persistence issues we mention in the next section. Given the
short data span and the frequency, they may not have enough observed cycles.
5.2 The chi-square test of goodness of ﬁt to Benford’s Law
Such a goodness-of-ﬁt test compares the empirical frequencies b qj of the digits j 2 f1;:::;9g of the
numbers arising in a given data set to the theoretical frequencies qj prescribed by Benford’s Law, via






qj, where N denotes the total number of ﬁrst digit observations
available. The statistic D2 converges in distribution to a chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of
freedom as N ! ¥; practitioners think of the distribution of D2 to be already close enough to this
limit whenever N > 30 and Nqj > 5 for all j 2 f1;:::;9g (van der Vaart [1998], p. 243). These
conditions are in our case N > 5

minjqj = 5=q9 > 110. This approximation is used for P–values
associated with values of the statistic D2 in the tables. The above-mentioned test is powerful; it is easy
to show by concentration-of-the-measure techniques (see Rivoirard and Stoltz [2009], pp. 57–58) that
the probability of not rejecting any distribution of the ﬁrst digits other than Benford’s Law when the
ﬁrst digits indeed conform to Benford’s Law is exponentially small in N, where the constant in the
exponent depends on the discrepancy between the alternative distribution tested and Benford’s Law.
The idea of detecting manipulations in the data by tests of conformity to Benford’s Law is now
well established is auditing and accounting, after the seminal article of Nigrini (1996) and the suc-
cessful use of his methodology by the authorities of the city of New York, leading to the detection of
frauds in seven companies; see Nigrini (1999) for an extended review of many other successful sto-
ries. The methodology there is to use as the data set to be tested all quantities appearing in accounts
(the values of all individual transactions); the theoretical justiﬁcation behind this is idea is mainly the
property P2 discussed above. Other occurrences and practical uses of Benford’s Law can be found,
e.g., in Hill (1995b); one can cite, among others, stock market data (Ley, 1996) and census statistics
as occurrences and the design of more efﬁcient computers as a possible use.
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5.3 Global conformity of our proposed data set to Benford’s Law
We ﬁrst use chi-square tests of goodness of ﬁt to show that our data set indeed conforms globally to
Benford’s Law, as suggested by the properties P1–P3 and the existing literature. We consider here the
full and stable samples, as well as those formed by OECD and non-OECD countries. The ﬁrst and
second columns of Table III indicate the number of countries encompassed by the economic condition
considered, as well as the average number of quarters per country. In the third column we report the
corresponding P–value and in the fourth column the value of N. Since the P–values are much larger
than any conventional threshold for rejecting a null hypothesis, the data set considered globally (and
all other subsets here) conforms to Benford’s Law.
5.4 Conformity of typical subsets of the BOPS data set to Benford’s Law
In this paper we consider subsets of the entire BoP data set deﬁned by some economic conditions and
show that some of them, for appropriately chosen conditions, lead to subsets whose distributions of
the ﬁrst digits do not conform to Benford’s Law. But before doing this we need to show that in the
BOPS data set typical (most of the randomly drawn) subsets do obey the latter law!
As we detail below, a persistence issue appears in a signiﬁcant fraction of the data series, which
is compensated by the heterogeneity between countries. Subsets corresponding to a small number of
countries and/or containing many consecutive or close-in-time quarters of these countries typically
do not conform to Benford’s Law while the ones corresponding to the choice of a large number of
countries and/or a few number of quarters per country do. This is in line with properties P1 and P2:
property P1 may require very large sample sizes, while property P2 indicates that smaller sample
sizes for each country can be compensated by grouping the data corresponding to different countries.
5.4.1 Persistence
We illustrate persistence on the top part of Table IV, where we estimated the probability that when
choosing a given number C of countries at random from our data set, the data subset formed passes
the goodness of ﬁt test against Benford’s Law at the 5% level. This table shows that a signiﬁcant
fraction of the subsets formed byC countries, withC 6 70, cannot be said to be distributed according
to Benford’s Law. Only when taking a large number of countries (e.g., C = 80), one gets subsets that
typically conform to Benford’s Law.
In the subsets grouped by economic conditions, however, fewer countries will be typically in-
volved; fewer quarters too, and this will be the key. Indeed, as is shown in the bottom part of Ta-
ble IV, the rejection rates become smaller as either the number C of involved countries increases or
the number M of quarters picked at random for each country decreases.
This can be explained by persistence of data from one quarter to another and/or structural breaks
in the series for individual countries (Section C.2.2 in Appendix C); it is crucial to deal with it when
a small number C of countries is involved (otherwise enough heterogeneity is introduced for the
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aggregated data to conform to Benford’s Law). We use net items from the IMF BOPS database to
reduce persistence as much as possible, but obviously an extra treatment is needed.
One solution is to select only the less persistent series (Section C.2.3 in Appendix C); doing
so, however, one may not detect the manipulations on the most crucial series that are watched and
analyzed by investors, which can be the most persistent ones as well (e.g., the balance on the current
account or goods). Some persistent series in fact may also be such because they are manipulated. This
is why we focus on the fact that conformity to Benford’s Law is more likely when the data subset is
formed randomly by taking few quarters only (relatively to the number of countries) as in Table IV.
5.4.2 A methodological remedy: Considering random sub-subsets
We need to quantify whether a large enough proportion of the data subsets conform to Benford’s
Law for the whole data set to be declared as abiding Benford’s Law. This is why we introduce the
following new statistical methodology.
To assess the conformity of a subset D of the data, we do not consider all country–quarter pairs
of the corresponding subset, but take a small fraction f of them at random and test the conformity of
the obtained random subset to Benford’s Law (at the 5% level), a fact that we denote by RD, which is
therefore a Bernoulli random variable. We repeat this procedure a large number of times, say, 1;000
times, by ﬁxing D but by choosing different sub-subsets of it at random. The average rejection rate
will be an indicator of conformity to Benford’s Law without the bias due to persistence (and, due to
the randomness, to any structural breaks in the data). Formally, the procedure above gives rise to the
random variables RD;1; RD;2; :::; RD;1000, which, conditionally to D, are independent and identically
distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter denoted by qD. We consider the
empirical mean RD;1000 of these random variables as the statistic of interest.
The heuristics behind this procedure is to reduce efﬁciently the average number of consecutive
quarters at hand per country, thus weakening persistence, and to consider qD instead of the P–value
quantifying the goodness of ﬁt of D against Benford’s Law. The repetition of the procedure aims at











is a conﬁdence interval at a 95% conﬁdence level for qD, where, given that the typical realized values
of RD;1000 are around 0:10, the precision of the estimation of the rejection rate qD is about 2%.
To use this new criterion, we ﬁrst determine the typical values of the statistic RD;1000 when f 2
f5%;10%; 20%g and D is a set drawn at random32 from Benford’s distribution with a given size
32Of course, it is immediate that in this case, the expectation of RD;1000 (with respect to the choice of D and the random
subset) is 5% but we want a sharper idea of its distribution, namely, good estimates of its tail.
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N. Results are in Table V, which provides estimates of the quantiles of the underlying distribution
according for f = 10%, which is the values mostly used in this paper; the quantiles for f = 5%
and f = 20% can be found in Table XIV in Appendix C. These estimates were constructed by
running 1;000 times the above procedure on randomly generated sets D. This involved computing
106 goodness-of-ﬁt tests per cell; because of the computational cost, no sharper estimates based on
more repetitions are given.
This method provides us with another test of conformity to Benford’s Law of subsets D; this test,
given D, compares the obtained value of RD;1000 to the above quantiles and is then able to associate
a P–value with the hypothesis of conformity to Benford’s Law. This is done by identifying in which
interval of the last line of Table V (corresponding to the chosen f) this value lies in. For instance, if
the realized value of the statistic RD;1000 is 8:5 and f was chosen equal to 10%, the corresponding
P–value is between 1% and 5%; or if the realized value is 5:4 and f was chosen equal to 5%, the the
corresponding P–value is larger than 5%.
The subsamplings in proportions f 2 f5%; 10%; 20%g. are called, respectively, 1-in-20 (when
f = 5%), 1-in-10 (when f = 10%), and 1-in-5 (when f = 20%) criteria. We include the 1-in-10
criterion in our main results as this already delivers good randomness of the sampled data, but is not
as demanding in terms of the required observations as the 1-in-20 criterion.33
5.5 Our new methodology and the conformity of the BOPS data set
We include all the criteria discussed above (as well as the one using less persistent series described
in Appendix C) in Table III and ﬁnd a good adequation of the ﬁrst digits of the BoP data to Benford’s
Law conﬁrming our ﬁndings from Section 5.3. This is true for the full and stable samples. It does
not appear either important whether we restrict the samples to include only OECD members (as of
1989) or not. This is very important, as we do not ﬁnd that non-OECD countries have non-Benford
distributions of the ﬁrst digits as an entire group taken together, which is different from the results
of Nye and Moul (2007) on the Penn World Table dataset; we further investigate groups of countries
that may have driven the results of Nye and Moul (2007) in Sections 6.5 and 6.6.
6 Empirical results
We discuss here in detail the results for our preferred “stable” subsample of countries which pro-
vided data at least once each year in the period 1995-2007 and back them with the results from the
full sample and other robustness checks. We perform traditional chi-square goodness-of-ﬁt tests and
our developed 1-in-10 randomized tests on the subsamples grouping country–quarter pairs by eco-
nomically meaningful characteristics to detect any irregularities in the ﬁrst-digit behavior. The null
33To ensure that for each chi-square goodness-of-ﬁt that need to be performed at least 110 observations, as mentioned
above, are available, at least 1;100 and 2;200 are respectively needed to compute the 1-in-10 and 1-in-20 criteria.
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hypothesis is that the ﬁrst digits of the data are drawn from Benford’s distribution. We consider that
the null is rejected if it is so for both tests. Based on our model in Section 3, we believe that some
groups of countries have higher incentives to tweak their BoP statistics than others. Fixed exchange
rate regime countries may be wary to provide truthful information about the developments in the BoP
because of a fear of an attack on their currency that unfavorable information may trigger. Countries
with high net foreign asset positions in terms of GDP, those having negative current account balances
or ﬁscal deﬁcits may fear that too much of negative information in the BoP data may spur a nervous
reaction of investors and cause capital outﬂows, which they would like to avoid.
In grouping countries we investigate subsets that are the unions of various conditions. While
investigating the speciﬁcity of countries partitioned according to their exchange rate regimes, current
accountorﬁscalbalances, wealsolookatsubgroupsofcountriesthathaverelativelylowernetforeign
assets excluding foreign direct investment to GDP (in tables, denoted as NFA EXCL FDI GDP) or
higher foreign equity liabilities to GDP ratio (EQ LIAB GDP). Additional criteria (for example for
the exchange rates) are presented in tables in Appendix C. For the international investment positions,
we took the top 75% of countries ranked in terms of negative net foreign assets or foreign liabilities.34
In all cases, we use previous year’s ﬁgures for grouping countries. So, e.g., to test for a group of
countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes that also have low net foreign assets (excluding FDI) in
the stable sample, we took all the countries which had the net foreign assets (excluding FDI) to GDP
ratio lower than  0:0201 in the preceding year that also had a ﬁxed regime.35 As a measure of capital
openness we used the foreign equity liabilities/GDP ratio. A relatively higher value of this indicator
shows that a country is de facto more open to private capital ﬂows than others, and hence may be also
more prone to capital outﬂows.36
The amount of data that we were able to gather allows for grouping countries into many different
subsamples; however with many restricting conditions these subsamples become small, containing
few countries with many quarters of data which would lead to easy rejections of Benford’s distribution
due solely to persistence, as discussed in Section 5.4. In such cases we want to rely on the 1-in-10
condition but then we need at least 1,100 observations in the sample, as discussed in Section 5.4.2.
Hence we are unable to slice the data very ﬁnely; this is against our story as we cannot condition very
well in each category for countries that may have higher incentives to cheat.
34In the robustness checks, we also use the top 90%, 80%, 66:66% or 50% of countries (not reported).
35The quantiles of a given economic quantity (e.g., net foreign assets to GDP) were computed by considering all the
available values of the quantity as countries and quarters vary; that is, at most one value of the quantity per country–
quarter pair of the sample (full or stable) was considered: none when the quantity was unavailable and one when the
data contained information about it. For this reason the number of available observations in, for instance, the top 10% or
lower 10% of the country–quarter pairs for this criterion may differ; the difference is due to the grouping according to the
criterion by itself.
36We did not use the total portfolio liabilities (equity and debt) as many debt liabilities for a country consist of foreign
denominated debt which is traded outside of the country borders. There are also fewer data points for this measure.
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Robustness checks for our ﬁndings. We offer several robustness checks of our main goodness-
of-ﬁt tests, most of which are shown in Appendix C. First of all, we typically test whether for the
complement of the set for a given restricting condition (or an alternative regime in the case of an ex-
change rate regime) we reject Benford’s distribution for the ﬁrst digits as well or not. Such a rejection
would make our claim of the relevance of a potential category for grouping countries and detecting
data manipulation vacuous. Secondly, we seek a conﬁrmation of our results for the stable sample in
the full sample as well. Next, we want to know whether it is not only one country which drives the
result for a particular category. This may indicate that out of the whole group only one country is
either providing false information or, for example, suffers from a dire problem of persistence in its
quarterly data. The fact that such a country would drive the results would invalidate the generality
of the claim. This number of countries driving the results (which we label as the “stability index”) is
quantiﬁed by the number of countries which, when excluded from the subset, lead to the acceptance
of the null hypothesis at a level of 10%; that is, we count the number of countries such that when
they are excluded one at a time the P–value associated with the goodness-of-ﬁt test to Benford’s Law
increases from less than 5% to more than 10%. We would like our stability index to be zero when we
expect to reject the null hypothesis. We also test for the rejection of Benford’s distribution for the less
persistent items and offer results for different criteria based on random sub-subsets (1-in-5 and 1-in-
20). Finally, in Section 6.6 we rerun the tests for our principal results excluding countries with poor
governance to assure that the worst countries in terms of institutional rankings are not responsible for
our ﬁndings.
6.1 Different exchange rate regimes
In Table VI (see also Tables XVIII–XXI in Appendix C) we present the tests for the conformity of
the ﬁrst digits of the BoP data with Benford’s distribution for country–quarter pairs groups in terms
of their exchange regimes at the end of a quarter. The left-hand column presents the characteristics of
the groups considered. Additional groupings are presented in Tables IX and X.
Any exchange rate regime where the intervention of the central bank was substantial (a currency
board, a conventional peg, a crawling peg, a crawling band) was labeled in our data set as “ﬁxed.”37
Such a wide range of regimes was classiﬁed together to have a large number of different countries.
We label a regime as “ﬂoating” when it was deemed by the IMF as being independently ﬂoating.38 It
is to note that the currencies that were a part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism I or II in a
37Consequently, for example crawling band regimes prior to 1998, when the IMF adopted a new classiﬁcation, were
coded as being ﬁxed from the category of managed ﬂoating.
38The remainder of the countries have regimes which are difﬁcult to classify into either category. For some managed
exchange rate regimes (“Managed ﬂoating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate” in the IMF nomenclature) it
is difﬁcult to make a call whether it is a ﬂoating regime or not; and we preferred only to make conservative assessments.
Secondly, we classify here also countries when they do not have any own legal tender (Panama, El Salvador or Ecuador).
Indeed, in our tests, countries with regimes that are neither ﬁxed or ﬂoating exhibit different behavior than the two “ideal”
regimes (see Section 6.1.1).
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given quarter are considered by the IMF to belong to the ﬁxed category prior to the introduction of
the Euro and as ﬂoating afterwards.
First of all, we observe that the null hypothesis of conformity to Benford’s Law is rejected for
ﬁxed exchange rate countries both for the stable and full samples at a 1% signiﬁcance level. The
subsets of countries that have ﬁxed exchange rate regimes contain many countries (49 countries with
26.6 quarters on average for the stable sample and 84 countries with 32.6 quarters on average for the
full sample) so that we believe based on Section 5.4.1 that the neither persistence nor structural breaks
are driving our results. The 1-in-10 criterion conﬁrms this. The important thing to notice is that any
irregular behavior detected here may not be country speciﬁc, as many countries in our samples (27
and 40 respectively for the stable and full samples) change the ﬁxed exchange rate regime to ﬂoating
(or the other way round) at least once.
Moreover, after imposing more restrictive conditions groups of countries with ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes have distributions of the ﬁrst digits for which the hypothesis of Benford’s distribution is re-
jected at a 1% level for all series. The 1-in-10 criterion conﬁrms our ﬁndings as these statistics are
always greater than 10. More precisely, the level of signiﬁcance of the rejection increases consider-
ablywhenwefurtherreﬁnethepictureandconsidercountrieswhichbelongtotheupper75%interms
of the (negative) net foreign assets (with or without foreign direct investment), equity liabilities, and
the size of their total foreign liabilities (shown in Appendix C). This is also true for ﬁxed exchange
rate regime countries that have negative current account or ﬁscal balances (Tables IX and X). This
supports our hypothesis that countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes that would be more sensi-
tive to capital ﬂows have an interest in tinkering with the signals that they send out to investors. In
particular, the rejection rate of Benford’s distribution for countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
and relatively liquid equity markets within our sample (which means they need to be de facto open
to individual ﬁnancial ﬂows) is 0:00004% in the stable sample and 0:0007% in the full sample! This
occurs for a large number of countries (38 and 58 countries respectively) in this category with an
average data span of 17.8 and 24.2 quarters. Our ﬁndings square with the model that we presented in
Section 3: that the countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes may wish to misreport data; and among
these countries it is those that have higher negative net asset positions or higher openness to capital
ﬂows that have more incentives to do so.
Theseresultssurviveourstresstests(showninTablesXX–XXIinAppendixC). Forthestableand
full samples, the hypotheses of Benford’s distribution of the ﬁrst digits are still rejected even when
we exclude from the sample each country one-by-one (as the values “0” for the stability indexes
indicate); which means that there may be several countries in a given group that are responsible for
the result. Even when we run the tests on less persistent series of the BoP, we still get rejections of
the hypothesis of the ﬁrst-digit distribution being Benford at a 5% level–except for the full sample
for the ﬁxed exchange rate regimes that have more liquid equity markets or the entire unconditioned
group. The 1-in-5 and 1-in-20 criteria tell the same story as the 1-in-10 criterion. These provide a
strong indication that the rejections may not be due to the persistence of the data. We also run the
tests excluding the entries on the reserve assets, which in ﬁxed exchange rate regimes may experience
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large movements due to the readiness of the central bank to buy and sell currency at a prespeciﬁed
rate (column 4 in Tables XX–XXI in Appendix C). This is important, as this is the only item in the
BoP that a central bank can control directly. It does not seem thus that the unusual distribution of
the ﬁrst digits for ﬁxed regimes comes from the activity in this entry and hence directly from central
bank intervention. Taking different quantiles for the conditions preserves all of the results for the top
90, 80, and 66.66 percents of the conditions and most for the 50 percent (however, we start having
few observations here for some conditions). The picture does not change when we condition on
contemporaneous year values of net foreign asset/GDP or liabilities/GDP ratios.
Our results for ﬁxed exchange rate regimes contrast strongly with similar tests for the ﬂoating
exchange rates regimes, for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected even for one category, also
when we use the same conditions on the investment positions of a country (Tables VI, IX and X).
Noticealsothatthenumberofcountrieswithﬂoatingregimesincludedineachsampleisalwayslower
than for the ﬁxed regimes in the same category; again this may be an indication that the persistence
issue does not matter here and that properties P1-P3 are at work here.
It seems odd that our results would occur only due to the speciﬁcity of the economic processes
under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The fact that some items of the BoP like changes in reserves may
be more variable in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime should not matter (and indeed, when we exclude the
reserves entry, the conclusions are not different – cf. above) as long as the processes generating the
data are well behaved and conditions P1–P3 are preserved. In a ﬁxed exchange regime, there is still
inﬂation, economic and population growth that would lead the BoP data to evolve according to a pro-
cess that leads to Benford’s Law; and we still aggregate across many countries. Some less vulnerable
ﬁxed exchange regimes country groups do exhibit ﬁrst digit distributions for which the hypothesis
that these are drawn from Benford’s distribution cannot be rejected – for example for countries with
positive ﬁscal balances (Table X), OECD countries as of 1989 (line 5 of Tables XVIII–XIX in Ap-
pendix C), countries with relatively low liabilities/GDP ratios in the sample (not shown), or those
with Institutional Investor ratings39 above 68 (not shown). Also, the rejections of the null hypothesis
for vulnerable countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes (those more indebted or being more open
to capital ﬂows) are stronger than for ﬁxed regimes that are not vulnerable (if the null for the latter
is rejected at all). Another question thus appears: can this be driven by less developed countries that
for example score badly in terms of the quality of institutions?40 This again seems unlikely, as we
obtain increases in the strength of rejections (lower P–values, higher 1-in-10 criteria) when adding
further conditions. In particular, we obtain strongest rejections for countries with ﬁxed regimes and
most internationally open capital markets, which is typically the feature of more developed countries
(see also Section 6.6 for further discussion and tests of this issue).
It thus appears that among countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes there might be some (but
39According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) such countries are advanced economies that are credible debtors.
40When we split the countries at the median of their WGI scores, it turns out that ﬁxed exchange rate regimes are
adopted equally often by both groups created in this way. See Table XLVII in Appendix C.
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probably not all!) which strategically misinform investors as the distribution of the ﬁrst digits of the
BoP data they report is unusual. This is true especially for countries which may face higher outﬂows
due to the stock of liabilities they owe to the outside world. It becomes even more so for countries
which are de facto open in terms of capital ﬂows (and have higher equity/GDP liabilities than other
countries). There is economic rationale why this may be the case: in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime the
aggregate information contained in the behavior of the exchange rate is missing, and investors need
to rely more on the information provided by a country, which may want to tweak it in order to put
itself in a more favorable light.
6.1.1 Subcategories of exchange rates
We report here further results of our tests among ﬁner IMF exchange rate categories. These tests are
less reliable, as we have fewer countries in each group, and persistence may be a larger problem. We
present two studies in Table VII (supplementary tables in Appendix C). First, we compare different
exchange rate regimes. In the top panel of Table VII we observe that the Benford’s Law is rejected for
the ﬁrst digits of data in both Chi-square and 1-in-10 tests from countries with crawling peg regimes.
Using our 1-in-10 criterion we also ﬁnd rejections at a 5% level for countries with currency board
and managed ﬂoat regimes. This, however, may not be the best metric to measure countries with
vulnerability of their exchange rate regime. For example, Cape Verde, a country with a conventional
peg regime throughout our sample, has very little capital ﬂows as measured by equity/GDP held by
foreigners (a maximum of 0:0055% in the sample). Therefore, we additionally scrutinize countries
that are de facto more open to capital ﬂows (lower panel of Table VII), and therefore may be more
vulnerable to any currency attacks or rapid capital movements. Interestingly, now we reject the Ben-
ford distribution for the ﬁrst digits for all ﬁxed exchange rate types and managed ﬂoat regimes as
well when using P–values from Chi-square tests and all except conventional pegs using the 1-in-10
criterion.41 This means that we get rejections for the countries which manage their currencies and are
vulnerable to capital ﬂows. This is also true for countries with currency board regimes – and these
are the same four countries providing data as in the stable sample – but for different (shorter) time
periods when they experience higher capital ﬂows. On the full sample, for all ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes with higher capital ﬂows the null can be rejected at a 5% level both in Chi-square tests and
the tests based on the 1-in-10 criterion.
6.2 Countries with high negative foreign asset liabilities
InTableVIII(seealsoTablesXXVI–XXIXinAppendixC)weshowtheP–valuesoftestsfordifferent
centiles of the data when countries are ranked according to the ratios of net foreign assets excluding
41For the currency board regimes, due to a lack of a sufﬁcient number of observations we could not calculate the 1-in-10
criterion. The 1-in-20 criterion that could be calculated strongly points to a rejection at a 1% level.
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foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks to GDP for the stable sample. This is the most apt measure of
the capital stock that could rapidly move out of a country; FDI ﬂows, which are largely immobile in
the short run, are excluded, and we take the net value of assets. We use the previous year’s value for
the current year quarters to group countries.
For the ﬁrst digits of the BoP data for the 10% and 25% of countries with the worst net foreign as-
set position (excluding FDI) in the stable sample the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level, with the 1-in-10 criterion conﬁrming this (for the top 10% countries on the full sample). These
results survive several robustness checks (shown in Tables XXVIII–XXIX in Appendix C). First, for
the complement of the sets deﬁned by conditions we cannot reject the null hypothesis of conformity
to Benford’s Law. With the exclusion of one or more countries we still reject Benford’s distribution
for the previously ﬂagged categories as indicated by the stability indexes. In addition, we obtain a
rejection of Benford’s distribution for the ﬁrst digits of the data for the 10% most indebted countries
on the stable sample also for the less persistent series. The 1-in-20 and 1-in-5 indicators give the same
indication as the 1-in-10 criterion.
We conclude that countries that have a high ratio of liquid indebtedness/GDP provided, in contrast
to others, BoP data which had an unusual distribution.
We do not get consistent and strong results in terms of the observed patterns for country groups
created using other measures of investment positions. In particular, for the full sample we obtain
rejections of Benford’s distribution of the ﬁrst digits also for countries with the highest net foreign
asset positions and the lowest liabilities/GDP, although we get similar results as for countries with net
foreign assets (excluding FDI) for the stable sample. These series may be less pertinent for our tests.
For example, the fact that a country has a high total liability/GDP ratio, like Switzerland, may not per
se be an indicator that it is vulnerable if it is has high assets as well. It may also mean that we cannot
condition the data well enough, for example we do not control for many features (like differences in
technology) which may affect the payoffs from misreporting. The data on liabilities may not be free
of errors as well; and these are data that we have on a yearly basis only. Therefore, if the data set
heterogeneity is large, the picture may be blurred with these less precise measures.
6.3 Countries with negative current account balances
We report in Table IX (see also Tables XXX–XXXIII in Appendix C) the results of tests for countries
with negative current account positions in a given quarter (labeled as CA in the tables).
By taking into account the P–values and the 1-in-10 criterion we observe that in both the the
stable (P–value of 0:2% and 1-in-10 criterion at a 1% signiﬁcance level) and the full sample (P–value
of 5:6% and 1-in-10 criterion indicating rejection at less than a 2% signiﬁcance level) we obtain a
rejection of the conformity of the ﬁrst digits of the BoP data to Benford’s distribution for countries
that have negative current account positions in a given quarter. 63 out of 66 countries at some point
in time have a negative current account ﬁgure (99 out of 103 for the full sample); this shows that the
rejection of this condition is not due to some country-speciﬁc data dissemination practices but rather
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to what is reported when the country in question is borrowing from the rest of the world in a quarter.
The same is true when we additionally select countries with the highest level of net indebtedness (with
or without FDI), ﬁxed exchange rates or ﬁscal deﬁcits (shown in Table X) that are running negative
current accounts.
The robustness tests are presented in Tables XXXII–XXXIII in Appendix C. In general they con-
ﬁrm our ﬁndings with some caveats. For the main condition – negative current account position in a
quarter – after excluding countries one-by-one from the sample we still always reject Benford’s distri-
bution for the ﬁrst digits of the data for the stable sample. It seems that some additional conditioning
(for example, choosing countries with high liabilities/GDP ratios, with or without FDI accounted for)
have in fact little importance in characterizing countries with unusual ﬁrst-digit distributions, as we
reject the null hypothesis for the complement of the set. The 1-in-5 and 1-in-20 criteria conﬁrm the
ﬁndings of the 1-in-10 criterion.
Overall, the rejections we ﬁnd seem to indicate that countries requiring the ﬁnancing of their
borrowing (as their current account balances are negative) may be willing to misinform investors,
especially among the countries included in the stable sample.
6.4 Countries with ﬁscal deﬁcits
We group countries also according to whether they had a positive general government ﬁscal balance
in a given year or not (labeled as FISC in the tables). Results are shown in Table X in the main text
as well as Tables XXXIV–XXXVII in Appendix C).
The evidence here is weaker than in the case of countries grouped according to other economic
criteria. Global P–values for country groups with either a positive or negative ﬁscal balance are below
5%. For the countries with positive balances this result is however not conﬁrmed for the full sample,
and for the stable sample the result is driven by 2 countries, exclusion of either of which removes the
rejection. Because the Benford’s distribution is rejected for the complement of the sample as well, we
do not conclude that a negative ﬁscal balance by a country itself is consistent with any strategic data
manipulation. However, further investigation shows interesting patterns.
When we study the grouping of countries according to a ﬁxed or ﬂoating exchange rate regime,
we ﬁnd a rejection of the Benford distribution of the ﬁrst digits for the BoP data for countries with a
negative ﬁscal balance and ﬁxed exchange rates (a P–value of 0:02%, corroborated on the full sample
and by our 1-in-10 criterion). In contrast, countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime but reporting
a budget surplus display a very good adequation of their statistics to Benford’s Law (a P–value of
70:6%). We do not reject the Benford’s Law for the ﬁrst digits of data from countries with ﬂoating
exchange rates either.
When we condition countries according to deﬁcits or surpluses in their current account and ﬁscal
balances (therefore creating four different groups), we reject the Benford’s Law only for the group
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of countries with both a negative current account and a ﬁscal deﬁcit (P–value of 0:007%).42 This
group contains the most countries and observations among the four possible groups according to this
partitioning in the sample. The ﬁnding is conﬁrmed for the full sample and by our 1-in-5, 1-in-
10 and 1-in-20 conditions. Countries with twin deﬁcits – in the current account and with negative
ﬁscal balances – would be the most vulnerable among all the four possible groupings, ceteris paribus:
they would be in need of borrowing to cover the ﬁscal deﬁcit, and doing so (on the macroeconomic
aggregate level) from international investors.
These results for the two aforementioned groupings survive our robustness checks. The “stability”
index is equal to zero meaning that no one country is driving the rejections. 1-in-5 and 1-in-20 criteria
give the same indications as the 1-in-10 criterion. The results are corroborated on the full sample.
Although for either the global partition or among the 75% of countries with the lowest in-sample
NFA (without FDI) we get consistent rejections for both groups of countries (with either positive or
negative ﬁscal balances), we ﬁnd two highly interesting patterns nevertheless: countries with negative
ﬁscal balances and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes or current account deﬁcits display unnatural patterns
in their ﬁrst-digit data.
6.5 Quality of institutions and data provision
We also study how institutional quality affects the behavior of the ﬁrsts digits of provided data. For
this purpose, we use various WGI from the World Bank and report the results in Table XI (main
results for all indicators, on the stable sample). Detailed tables for all WGI indicators along with
robustness checks are omitted from the main text but are available in Appendix C.
Both the P–values from the goodness of ﬁt tests and the 1-in-10 criterion indicate that countries
ranked below the 50th percentile (and below the 25th as well) in the WGI data set in terms of cor-
ruption, political stability and the rule of law and below the 25th percentile in terms of government
effectiveness (in terms of the global WGI data set) exhibit BoP data with ﬁrst digits that have non-
Benford behavior. It appears thus that countries with poor institutions provide data of low quality.
This is a ﬁnding similar to Nye and Moul (2007) who show that in samples of economic data from
the Penn World Tables for non-OECD countries the hypothesis of Benford’s distribution of the ﬁrst
digits is rejected (but remember that for our BOPS data this is not the case for the entire group of
non-OECD countries, as witnessed by Table III). For rankings in terms of voice and accountability
and regulatory quality we obtained no consistent and interesting results.
For all the categories ﬂagged above the rejection of Benford’s distribution for the complement
of the set (i.e., for countries with better institutional rankings) of the ﬁrst digits fails. The exclusion
of one of the countries from the samples does not drive the results mentioned above, except for the
42For the group with positive ﬁscal and current account balances, the 1-in-10 criterion based on studying randomly
selected subsets of the data points to a rejection at a 5% level with the similar pattern for the full sample; but this is not
conﬁrmed by the P–value, so we do not consider it as a category for which we have a rejection.
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lower 25th percentile of government effectiveness in the stable sample. For tests ran on less persistent
series, we can reject Benford’s distribution at the 10% signiﬁcance level for the countries ranking
lowest 25% in terms of government effectiveness and political stability for both samples, and for
those ranking most corrupt for the stable sample; the evidence based on these is weak. The 1-in-20
and 1-in-5 criteria give rejections for the same categories, albeit sometimes at different conventionally
accepted signiﬁcance levels, as the 1-in-10 criterion.
Our results lead us to believe that countries with poor institutions produce BoP data with irregular
ﬁrst digit behavior. However, we do not have a story why such countries would manipulate the data.
The answer may be that it is not due to bad data collection procedures or methodologies.43 Firstly,
even high measurement errors should in practice cause the data to have ﬁrst digits obeying Benford’s
Law if the errors are well behaved, in view of the property P1 (see Section 5.1.1, as well as the
example described in the next section). Secondly, when we look at the tests based on the less persis-
tent series, there is hardly any evidence that countries with bad institutions do have weird ﬁrst-digit
distributions. If the rejection of Benford’s distribution would be caused by bad data collection, the
ﬁrst-digit distribution of the less persistent series should be also affected. Thus, a simple explanation
for the rejections for these groups of countries may be that their data exhibits persistence. Another
story may be that the institutions in these countries have lower scruples or fewer control mechanisms
(so that rightly they are ranked as having bad institutional quality) that prevent data falsiﬁcation. A
different point is that such countries may ﬁnd themselves more likely in a situation that encourages
misreporting. For example, as witnessed by Table XLVII in Appendix C, countries with poor institu-
tions in our sample typically are more indebted to foreigners, adopt ﬂoating regimes less often, and
are more likely to have negative current account and ﬁscal balances.
6.6 Are poor countries with bad statistical agencies driving our main results?
AvalidquestioninthiscontextiswhetherourmainﬁndingsinSections6.1–6.4aredrivenbybaddata
collection procedures employed in some countries or not. Moreover, Young (2009) claims that many
entries for data in the UN or World Bank data sets, for example for Sub-Saharan countries for growth
or price level data, are not based on actual measurements by governments but on extrapolations or
from other sources. Hence, the data that we might be working with could be either subject to errors
during collection or be actually ad hoc or artiﬁcially created by various agencies.
We are not aware of how grave the problem of mismeasurement of BoP entries is for the countries
included in our sample44 and are not aware of the IMF extrapolating the BoP data that are obtained
from monetary and statistical authorities of countries. We note that the data we use are available for
only 103 countries for the studied period 1989–2007 and for many countries (and data series) there
43Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor (2009) compare the quality rankings of data collection methods of various countries with
the rejections of the Benford’s distributions of their macroeconomic series, ﬁnding no consistent pattern between the two.
44Though Curcuru et al. (2009) argue the mismeasurement of the BoP entries even for the United States is severe.
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are gaps. We have 14 Sub-Saharan countries (including South Africa) in the full sample while only
4 (including South Africa) in the stable sample. If we look at all WGI indicators characterizing the
countries in the data, we have countries which boast on average governance scores that are higher than
the means for the entire WGI data sets (which contains for 2007 up to 215 entries). For example (as
witnessed by Table II), for the most relevant WGI indicator in this respect – government effectiveness
– the average rank value for the full sample is 60 while for the stable sample 63.5 (whereas the average
rank value in the WGI data set by construction is 50).
Theoretically, errors in measurement should not matter for our results as long as they can be rep-
resented by an appropriate stochastic process (see Section 5.1.1). For example, if the goods balance is
increasing exponentially but its multiplicative variations are measured with independent errors which
are identically distributed45 (possibly according to a distribution which is centered around 1, or ac-
cording to positively or negatively skewed distributions with respect to 1 which could account for
repeated over- or under-estimation of some quantities), the series should adhere to Benford’s Law if
enough datapoints are observed.
In order to address the issue empirically, we reran our basic results excluding Sub-Saharan coun-
tries or those with bad governance scores. We present the results for the most relevant categories in
Table XII for the stable sample (see also Tables XLVIII–LI in Appendix C). We see that our basic
result on the behavior of the ﬁrst digits of the BoP statistics for ﬁxed versus ﬂoating regimes does not
change, and the strength of the rejection of the null hypothesis for the ﬁxed regimes is similar both
when we exclude only Sub-Saharan countries (keeping South Africa) on the basis that these countries
might not have developed capabilities for clean data collection, or when we exclude countries ranked
inthelowest25%intermsofgovernmenteffectivenessintheWGIdata. Ifwelookatsomeadditional
conditioning, considering for example the exchange rate regime and the openness to equity ﬂows,
again the picture is the same. In this case, we are not surprised: very few countries with bad gover-
nance have high equity liabilities and also ﬁxed exchange rates (the average government effectiveness
rank for countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate in the stable sample and equity liabilities/GDP> 0:0098
is 70.8). The results are conﬁrmed for the stability index for these results (0) as well as if we only
look at the less persistent series – again we obtain a rejection for the ﬁxed exchange rate regimes but
not for ﬂoating ones. If we exclude Sub-Saharan countries from the group of countries that have the
lowest net foreign assets to GDP ratio (excluding foreign direct investment liabilities), the rejection
patterns are conﬁrmed. The evidence is weaker when we exclude from the same group the countries
with lowest government effectiveness but we still obtain a rejection at 5% when we scrutinize the
P–value. For the countries with a negative current account in a given quarter, the null hypothesis is
rejected at 0:1% level when we exclude Sub-Saharan countries and at 6:7% when we exclude those
with lowest government effectiveness scores. The results for countries grouped by ﬁscal balances are
the only ones for which we cannot obtain rejections after countries with poor institutional scores are
45Section C.2.1 in Appendix C indicates however that these assumptions of independence and/or identical distribution
can be strongly relaxed; more general random errors can thus be considered.
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dropped from the sample. Nevertheless, for the groupings of interest for which we claimed rejections
in Section 6.4 – countries with negative ﬁscal balances and ﬁxed exchange rates or countries with
twin deﬁcits – we still reject the Benford distribution of the ﬁrst digits of the data when we exclude
countries either ranked in the lowest 25% in terms of government effectiveness or the Sub-Saharan
countries (except South Africa) for the stable sample at least a 5% level (results not shown).
Based on our discussion above, we do not believe that our results are driven by poor countries
with bad data collection procedures.
6.7 Other conditions for deﬁning the subsets of the data
We have tried various other conditioning of the data in our search of unusual reporting patterns.46
First of all, we studied (akin to Section 6.2) whether countries with more capital openness (deﬁned
as high foreign equity liabilities/GDP ratios) exhibit non-Benford distribution of their ﬁrst digits of
the BoP data. Scrutinizing the tails of data sorted according to this measure, we ﬁnd no results that
this is the case.
Next, forcountriesthatjoinedtheEurozoneweinspectedtheperiodinwhichtheyhadtomaintain
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime and satisfy certain economic performance criteria for admission. We
do not ﬁnd any evidence that the BoP data are unusual for up to 5 years prior to joining the zone.
However, interestingly, we ﬁnd that the Benford distribution is rejected for the ﬁrst digits of the BoP
statistics for these countries after joining the Euro zone. For the full sample, the P–value is 0:08% and
the 1-in-10 criterion 14.6 (both statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level) with 4623 observations and 11
countries (Belgium and Luxembourg are not in our data set), while for the stable sample the P–value
is 0:18% with a 1-in-10 criterion of 14.1 (4259 observations and 10 countries).
We also investigated countries with episodes of sovereign default and banking crises (data on their
timing obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff [2009]). For countries that defaulted on their sovereign
debt within our sample period, we do not ﬁnd rejections of the null hypothesis either for one, two
or three year brackets preceding a default (results shown in Table LIII in Appendix C). The ﬁrst
digits of the statistics released by countries three, ﬁve, ten and twenty years after default appear to
conform with the Benford distribution. This is consistent with investors threatening a more severe
punishment for future default (or misinformation) but also with lower capital ﬂows after a default
occurs. After default, a country’s actions may be also scrutinized more closely by investors or the
IMF. However, we ﬁnd evidence that within one year after enduring banking crises countries report
suspicious distributions of the BoP data. For these, we can reject the hypothesis that the ﬁrst digits
46For geographically-based country groupings (see Section C.4.2 in Appendix C), we rely on the 1-in-10 criterion as
the persistence issue may be severe. We ﬁnd that countries in Africa and the Middle East (for both the full and stable
samples), in Latin America and Eastern Europe (for the stable sample) have suspect distributions of the ﬁrst digits. This
should be taken with caution as there are relatively few countries in each group with many quarters of data each, which
may make rejecting the null hypothesis easier (tests on the least persistent series do not conﬁrm any of the ﬁndings). There
may be also too little heterogeneity for property P2 to be able to compensate for the possible persistence issues.
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conform to Benford’s distribution at 0:2% with 5,094 observations on the full sample and 5:6% for
the stable sample (2,487 observations).
There seems not to be any evidence that countries suffering substantial falls in their Institutional
Investor country credit ratings, either contemporaneous, lead or lagged, offer suspect statistics.
Wefoundnostrongresultsforcountriesgroupedbytheleveloftheiryear-to-yearinﬂation, though
our 1-in-10 criteria reject the Benford distribution for the ﬁrst digits of statistics from countries with
an inﬂation rate higher than 10% both for the stable and full samples at a 2% level.
We inspect our data for main categories on a year-by-year basis in Section C.4.1 in Appendix C.
We ﬁnd that rejections of the Benford distribution for many vulnerable country groupings for 1996,
1997 and 2006. For 1997, one can rationalize the ﬁnding in favor of Proposition 5: a global, unex-
pected crisis put many countries in a position where they misreported their data. We do not know,
however, what were investors’ expectations in 1997 (and for the other years as well), so we do not
draw any conclusions from this exercise.
6.8 Summary of the empirical results
We ﬁnd results consistent with the hypothesis that countries strategically provide manipulated data
to economic agents. We observe rejections of Benford’s distribution for the ﬁrst digits of data issued
by groups of countries that are more vulnerable to high capital outﬂows. From the main results
shown in Tables VI, VIII, IX and X, we ﬁnd such pattern in 10 out of 13 groupings with the three
inconclusive ones involving partitions using ﬁscal balances. These rejections are rather category
than country speciﬁc, as data from many countries for different quarters enters different categories.
We obtain the strongest (also most robust) results for countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
though we also ﬁnd that countries with highest levels of net indebtedness and those that were running
current account deﬁcits have ﬁrst digits that have unusual, non-Benford distributions. The Benford
distribution is rejected for the ﬁrst digits of the BoP statistics for Euro-adopting countries after these
jointheEurozone. Theseﬁndingsconﬁrmtheviabilityoftheintuitiondevelopedbythesimplemodel
in Section 3. However, we do not ﬁnd general results for countries that were de facto more open to
capital ﬂows. This may be due to the fact that we are unable to capture the extent of their vulnerability
very ﬁnely; but for some subgroups of countries (for example those with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
and relatively high de facto openness) we still get very strong rejections of the null hypothesis. The
interesting ﬁnding on the ﬁxed exchange rate regime countries may show that the public is more
readily misinformed by governments when there is a larger scope for misinformation – for example
when the market prices aggregating private information are missing. We ﬁnd also evidence that
countries with weak institutions provide data that are non-Benford distributed; moreover, it seems
that they are not driving our main results in Sections 6.1–6.4.
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7 Conclusions
Inthispaperwetookaglimpseatthedarksideofthemoonofgovernmentstatistics. Weconcludethat
country–quarter pairs that correspond to economic situations in which countries would have higher
incentives to misinform investors lead indeed to different distributions of the corresponding ﬁrst digits
of the balance of payments data than Benford’s distribution, while for other country–quarter pairs the
data conforms to this distribution. This may of course be because there is a different underlying
process that rules the generation of balance of payments distributions in country–quarter pairs for
vulnerable countries, which we think is unlikely. It may be, however, simply that such countries
will at times falsify their balance of payments data in these quarters. This partial evidence on the
strategic character of misreporting points out that models in which governments emit public signals
(for example, the discussion on central bank transparency) should seriously consider the possibility
that this signal may be at times intentionally misleading. On the policy side, this paper calls for the
need to establish independent statistical agencies akin to that of independent central bankers. Some
countries that failed in having such an independent agency, like Argentina or Greece, were caught
red handed in altering economic data that they disseminated to the public. The possible welfare
implications of misinformation should also be investigated; the actions of Argentina or Greece show
that economic gains to governments, even if short-run, may exist and be substantial. In further work
we would like to extend our analysis to ﬁscal data from many data sets.
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A Incentives to misreport economic data:
Proofs of the stated results
We provide in this section the proofs of the results stated in Section 3 in the main text.
Existence and properties of the equilibrium with lying. Investors wish to maximize their ex-ante
return from investment, hence they will allocate capital K so that the marginal return from investment
in all countries is equalized, no matter whether they declare a Good or Bad state of the world. This
leads, on the one hand (when Ci  C for all countries i), to the stated fact that the capital Ki(si; ˜ r)
invested in country i does not depend on i but solely on si and ˜ r; on the other hand, that returns are
equal for countries declaring Good or Bad states as in (3). As ˜ r > ˆ r, investment return in countries
that declare a Good state of the world is lower than if all these countries would in fact be enjoying
a Good state. The equality (3) needs to be a feature of any efﬁcient allocation, as then investors are
indifferent between investing marginally more in one group of countries than in the other. Note also
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with X(˜ r;j) < 1: (5)
Given this and the global mobile capital supply K, we can ﬁnd the capital values K(b; ˜ r) and K(b; ˜ r),
the stock of capital in countries declaring a Bad and Good states respectively. Indeed, the market
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After some algebra and by substituting the equality ˜ r = ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r), one can show that
K(g; ˆ r) =
K+C
ˆ r+(1  ˆ r)(j+X jX)
:
We now show that j+X jX increases as j increases, which entails that K(g; ˆ r) then decreases;
the derivative of the considered expression with respect to j indeed equals (1 X)+(1 j)¶X=¶j,
where both summands are positive as X < 1 and as X(˜ r;j) is increasing in j as can be seen from
its closed-form expression. The interpretation is that as the fraction j of liars among countries with
si = b increases, the capital invested in countries declaring a high state of the world declines; this is
because the return from investment in these countries falls.
Countries. At equilibrium, in the interior when j 2 (0;1), countries are indifferent between lying
and reporting truthfully the state of the world when their state is si = b. When making their decision,
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they do not know ˆ r, hence their strategies can depend only on the information they have, i.e., on their
own state of the world and the knowledge of the distribution of r. The ﬁrst step is to analyze the
payoffs of countries given in (2). Since we showed above that the functions Ki giving the invested
capitals did not depend on i, the same is true for the return functions Ri, which we will simply denote
by R in the sequel (the same holds for the expected returns ER). A country that has a Good state of
the world sm = g will not declare a Bad state of the world; it would not only receive less capital from
investors (as these make decisions based on declarations only and K(g; ˜ r) < K(b; ˜ r)), but also obtain
a punishment. In other words, R(b;g; ˜ r) R(g;g; ˜ r) < 0. To analyze the incentive of countries with a
Bad state of the world, we introduce the gap D(˜ r) = R(b;g; ˜ r) R(b;b; ˜ r). Because of the antagonist
effects of the punishment and the increase of invested capital when lying, this gap can in principle be
positive, negative, or null.
Lemma 1. The gap in payoffs D(˜ r) is strictly decreasing in j, i.e., decreases as the proportion j of
liars is higher.
Proof. By deﬁnition of X and by (2), one gets that











but since X increases as j increases (as can be seen from its closed-form expression) and since the
above expression of D shows that it is a decreasing function of X, the conclusion follows.
The higher the j, the more liars given any ˆ r, and the lower the capital that is invested in countries
declaring g. Hence, there is a lower incentive to lie when the country in fact has a true state b. The
following result is immediate by taking expectations (with respect to ˜ r) in the lemma.
Proposition 6. The expected gap ER(b;g) ER(b;b) is strictly decreasing in j.
In particular, the mapping j 7! ER(b;g) ER(b;b) is one-to-one. If there exists a j 2 (0;1) such
that ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F then this j is unique and the investors can deduce it from the value of
F; in particular, they are then able to precisely deduce the value of ˆ r given the fraction of countries ˜ r
declaring a Good state of the world: since the strategies of countries do not depend on ˆ r, unknown to
the countries when making the declarations, and since ˜ r = ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r), the investors can learn the
true ˆ r = (˜ r j)=(1 j). If j 2 (0;1) then countries with sm = b are indifferent between declaring
truthfully and misreporting. If j = 1 then all countries with sm = b ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to lie than
to declare truthfully despite the expected punishment F. If j = 0 then all countries declare truthfully;
this is the case whenever F is large enough (larger than the expected gap in payoffs). All in all, we
showed that countries have the correct incentives given F and the parameters of the environment (the
stock of mobile capital, productivity differences between the Good and the Bad state, etc.).
Proof of Proposition 1. When j 2 (0;1) at equilibrium, one has ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F; but Propo-
sition 6 precisely stated that j 7! ER(b;g) ER(b;b) is decreasing, so that the inverse mapping
F 7! j of what happens at equilibrium is decreasing as well.








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
Comparative statics (proofs of Propositions 2–5). The simplest proof of the one of Proposition 5,
since this result does not rely on a partitioning of the countries into two groups.
Proof of Proposition 5. Countries make the choice whether to report g or b based on the properties
of the distribution of r, as at the moment of making the decision they do not know the actual fraction
ˆ r of countries enjoying a Good state. Hence, at a given equilibrium (i.e., for a given value of j), a
constant fraction j of those that obtained a b state lies and the fraction of liars in the entire population
is j(1  ˆ r), which is decreasing in ˆ r as stated.
The framework for all other propositions to be proved is to split countries into two groups, with
respective proportions x and 1 x, for which it is easy to see —following the same lines as above—
thatatequilibriumtheysharethesamecharacteristics; thisdeﬁnesacommoninvestedcapitalfunction
K or K in each group, a common expected return function ER or ER, a common cheating rate j or j,
and so forth. The observed proportion of countries declaring a Good state is now





the respective proportions of countries not truthfully declaring their states in each group are given by
(1  ˆ r)j
ˆ r+(1  ˆ r)j
and
(1  ˆ r)j
ˆ r+(1  ˆ r)j
:
As above, at equilibrium, investors can determine j and j and infer ˆ r from ˜ r.
Proof of Proposition 2. We are interested in the behavior of the countries when there is lying in equi-
librium, i.e., when j; j 2 (0;1) at equilibrium; in this case, as follows from an immediate adaptation
of the arguments above in each of the groups, ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F and ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F,
where each gap is still a decreasing function of the respective proportions j and j of liars (see Propo-
sition 6). The conclusion follows.
The proofs of the last two propositions are relegated due to their length to Appendix C, Sec-
tion C.1; we provide here only a sketch of how these are constructed.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 3. In any equilibrium, investors demand that investment brings ex-ante
the same return at the margin in either group of countries, irrespective of the declared state of the
world. We use this condition and ﬁnd that the following must be true: j < j if and only if K(g; ˜ r) >
K(g; ˜ r)foratleastone47 realization ˆ r. ToshowthatindeedK(g; ˜ r)>K(g; ˜ r)weusethatforequilibria
in the interior, ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F and ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F must hold, take a difference of
the two conditions and substitute.
47It can be shown that it will then hold for all realizations of ˆ r.








































1Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they might.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 4. We use a similar line of reasoning as in the above proof. From the
ex-ante return equalization on any group of countries, it can be shown that the stated j < j holds
if and only if K(b; ˜ r)=K(b; ˜ r) < K(g; ˜ r)=K(g; ˜ r) for at least one realization ˆ r. We use the same
property of the interior equilibrium ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F and ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F to show
that the right hand side of the equivalency condition holds.
B Tables and ﬁgures
They are reported in the following pages (one table or set of ﬁgures per page).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1  5 
 
Proportion  
f = 5% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 2,500  5.3  5.7  6.2  6.5 
N = 5,000  6.2  6.7  7.5  7.8 
N = 10,000  6.3  6.7  7.4  7.9 
N = 30,000  6.3  6.7  7.2  7.6 
N = 50,000  6.2  6.6  7.2  7.6 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 10% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,200  5.5  6.3  7.2  8.0 
N = 2,000  7.0  7.9  9.1  9.5 
N = 5,000  6.9  7.8  9.0  9.8 
N = 10,000  6.9  7.5  8.7  9.9 
N = 30,000  6.8  7.5  8.7  9.5 
N = 50,000  6.8  7.7  9.0  9.7 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 20% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,000  8.7  10.4  12.8  14.2 
N = 2,000  8.2  9.3  11.6  13.2 
N = 5,000  8.2  10.5  13.4  14.5 
N = 10,000  8.5  10.2  12.6  14.3 
N = 30,000  8.6  10.9  13.0  14.1 
N = 50,000  8.4  9.7  11.8  13.3 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 
N ≥ 1,000  8.7  10.9  13.4  14.5 
 
 
Table V: Estimates of the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable RD;1000 when D is chosen
at random according to Benford’s law and f equals 10%; estimates were obtained by drawing D at













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1C Additional material — Working paper
This is the companion working paper to the paper “Do countries falsify economic data strategically?
Some evidence that they might.” by Tomasz Michalski and Gilles Stoltz. It provides some technical
details on the material alluded at in the main body of the text. It contains
– extended proofs (Section C.1);
– additional discussion of the Benford law and its application to macroeconomic sequences (Sec-
tion C.2);
– list of countries included in the study (Section C.3);
– other results not discussed in the main text (Section C.4);
– moredetailedtablesofthemainresultsforthestablesample; tablesofresultsforthefullsample
and robustness checks (Section C.4.3).
C.1 Extended proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. In view of the respective proportions of liars stated above, the equality of
returns to investors for countries declaring Good states in both groups, i.e., considering the left-hand




ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r)
A(g)+
j(1  ˆ r)








ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r)
A(g)+
j(1  ˆ r)








ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r)
A(g)+
j(1  ˆ r)














is a decreasing function of j (no matter the value of ˆ r) and since a 1 < 0, the above stated equality
entails that j < j if and only if K(g; ˜ r) > K(g; ˜ r) for at least one48 realization ˆ r. We will prove that




















































1where expectations are taken with respect to ˆ r (which is distributed according to r). To do so, we











= ER(b;g) ER(b;b) = F;









= ER(b;g) ER(b;b) ER(b;g)+ER(b;b) = 0; (7)




































On the other hand, writing the equality of returns to investors for countries declaring Bad states in




a 1 = a A(b)
 
K(b; ˜ r)






































































(as can be seen by computing its derivative); if K(b; ˜ r) >C
for all ˆ r, then (6) is satisﬁed with an increasing function and the proof is concluded. Otherwise, there








































1is met as well.
Proof of Proposition 4. We consider two groups of countries with barriers to capital ﬂows of t < 1
and 1 respectively, with t < 1 being the fraction of returns that can be recuperated by investors ex-
post; quantities related to countries in the group with capital ﬂow barriers t will be indexed by the
overline bar. We need to prove that j<j: in equilibrium, when suffering a Bad state of the economy,
the countries with no barriers to ﬂows misreport more often than the countries with barriers t.
The ex-ante equality of returns demanded by investors (3) for countries declaring Bad states in




a 1 = t a

ˆ r
ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r)
A(g)+
j(1  ˆ r)











ˆ r+j(1  ˆ r)
A(g)+
j(1  ˆ r)





that is, K(b; ˜ r) = t1=(1 a)K(b; ˜ r) < K(b; ˜ r) and, as in (5), we set K(b; ˜ r) = X(ˆ r;j) K(g; ˜ r) and
K(b; ˜ r) = X(ˆ r;j) K(g; ˜ r). Note that the closed-form expression of X indicates that j 7! X(ˆ r;j) is
strictly increasing, for all ˆ r. We also introduce the factors l(b; ˆ r) and l(g; ˆ r) such that
K(b; ˜ r) = l(b; ˆ r) K(b; ˜ r) and K(g; ˜ r) = l(g; ˆ r) K(g; ˜ r):
Combining all these notations, we see that
l(b; ˆ r) X(ˆ r;j) K(g; ˜ r) = l(b; ˆ r) K(b; ˜ r) = K(b; ˜ r) = X(ˆ r;j) K(g; ˜ r) = X(ˆ r;j) l(g; ˆ r) K(g; ˜ r);
thus,
l(b; ˆ r) X(ˆ r;j) = X(ˆ r;j) l(g; ˆ r):
In view of this inequality, since X is increasing in its second argument, to show the desired inequality
j < j, it sufﬁces to show that l(b; ˆ r) < l(g; ˆ r) for at least one49 realization ˆ r. Since we showed
above that l(b; ˆ r) = t1=(1 a) < 1, we can assume that l(g; ˆ r) < 1 for all ˆ r (otherwise, the needed
property is immediately seen to hold).
Introducing the function ya;C(x) = A(b)
 
(1 a)xa +aCxa 1
, the equilibrium condition (7)

























































































K(b; ˜ r); l(b; ˆ r)
i
: (9)
We have that K(b; ˜ r) < K(g; ˜ r) as proceeds from (8) and will show below that Ya;C is decreasing in
its ﬁrst argument and increasing in its second argument; in view of the equality (9) this will entail that
l(g; ˆ r) > l(b; ˆ r) for some ˆ r and will conclude the proof.
Recall that we indicated above that l(g; ˆ r)<1 and l(b; ˆ r)<1 for all ˆ r. The fact that the mapping

















To study the monotonicity in t, we note that t 7! Ya;C(x;t) has the monotonicity of t 7! ya;C(tx). But
we already indicated at the end of the proof of Proposition 3 that ya;C was increasing on [C; +¥[;
since we only consider here pairs (x;t) such that tx > C (these pairs are such that tx = K(b; ˜ r) or
K(g; ˜ r)), this show that t 7! Ya;C(x;t) is indeed increasing for all x of interest, as claimed above.
Fortwogroupsofcountrieswithbarrierstocapitalﬂowsoft<1andt<1respectively, wheret<
t < 1 the above proof can be easily restated with rescaling the barriers to t  t=t for the country with
lower barriers. Neither the relative relationships between capital levels invested in these economies
nor the country payoffs (and the equilibrium condition) depend directly on these barriers.
C.2 Complements to Section 5:
The balance of payments data and Benford’s law
C.2.1 On property P1
We provide below a more detailed presentation of its mathematical foundations, with references to
the mathematical literature, and some other applications to macroeconomic data.
Deterministic sequences. The simplest mathematical generating model is the following; it is used
as a keystone to construct the subsequent models of this paragraph and of the models discussed in
Section 5.1.1. Pick numbers Y1;:::;Yn at random in the interval [1;10) such that the random vari-
ables log10Y1; :::; log10Yn are uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1); that is, we consider log–
uniform mantissas. Then, for all natural integers k1;:::;kn, the distribution of the ﬁrst digits of the
numbersY1  10k1; :::; Yn  10kn converges to Benford’s law as n grows.
Based on this, Diaconis (1977) shows that geometric sequences fa; a2; :::; ang with ratio a such
that log10a is irrational50 lead to sets of data that conform more and more closely to Benford’s law as








































1n grows. That is, almost all geometric sequences lead to Benford’s law as the set of rational numbers
has a null measure within the set of all real numbers. This implies that in practice all geometric
sequences linked to real data lead the data to obey Benford’s law.
A natural and important extension of this result is that for differences of such geometric processes
the Benford’s law is obeyed. Lemma 2.4 in Kaynar et al. (2010) shows that for given ratios a and b
(such that log10a is irrational) and any real numbers a and b, the sets

aa bb; aa2 bb2; :::; aan bbn	
(10)
conform more and more closely to Benford’s law as n grows.
Extensions to certain random geometric sequences. A combination of the results of Holewijn
(1969) and of some other classical results recalled, e.g., in Diaconis (1977) indicates that when (Xj)
is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables, the sets
fX1; X1X2; :::; X1X2Xng (11)
also conform more and more closely to Benford’s law as n grows provided that the common charac-
teristic function j of the Xj is such that y(2pk)6=1 for all natural integers k; this condition is satisﬁed
for almost all distributions. This result extends to differences of processes of the form (11), in the
same vein as in (10).
Many other extensions and variations around them exist (such as the considerations of martingale
difference sequences, which relaxes the hypotheses of independence and/or identical distribution),
which we do not mention in detail. We only indicate a recent fundamental article of Sch¨ urger (2008),
who studies the conformity to Benford’s law of processes of the form










; t = 1;2;:::;
where (Xt) is a martingale difference sequence with associated conditional variances (Vt); this process
is indeed of the form (11).
Other applications to macroeconomic data We indicated in Section 5.1.1 that various extensions
could be instantiated as special cases of the multiplicative form discussed above, including the case
of structural breaks that could be associated with deep economic crises or large shocks and/or the
presence of some errors or misreports in the data.
different from the ones of Benford’s law; consider the simple example when log10a = 2=3, in which case the sequence
is 102k=3 and contains only elements with ﬁrst digits equal to the ﬁrst digits of 102=3, 104=3, and 100, that is, 4, 2, 1; the








































1Indeed, as far as the structural breaks are concerned, we suppose that at each round, a break can
occur independently from the past, with a constant (small) probability. In this case, the Xj are given
by a two-step randomization, the ﬁrst step determining whether a break occurs and the second one
providing the adequate multiplicative factor, drawn at random according to a distribution depending
on the regime. Of course, for the conformity of the sets (11) to hold approximatively, we will then
need even larger values of n.
Moreover, the same two-step modeling shows that the presence of some errors or misreports in
the data does not impact per se its conformity to Benford’s law, provided that these errors can be
described in some random multiplicative manner.
C.2.2 More on persistence issues
We report here the perhaps deceiving results that are obtained when testing whether the data corre-
sponding to each country is Benford distributed or not: the test accepts the hypothesis of conformity
to Benford’s law at the level 5% for 58 countries but rejects it for 44 other countries (whereas no
conclusion can be drawn for the remaining country, Serbia, for which fewer than N = 110 observa-
tions are available). That is, if one chooses one country with enough observations at random, the
obtained data set will not conform to Benford’s law with probability 44=(44+58)  43:1%. There is
no striking pattern in countries for which we obtain these rejections. For example, we reject the null
hypothesis for the USA, France, Switzerland, Japan or Canada while for many non-OECD countries
we cannot. Some examples of obtained empirical distributions for different countries are reported in
Figure 1. Out of the individual three series presented (United Kingdom, Colombia and Zimbabwe)
only for the series for United Kingdom (976 observations) the hypothesis that they are drawn from
a Benford’s distribution are not rejected at a 1% level. The Colombian series (564 observations),
although with sizeable discrepancies, still has a distribution visually similar to Benford’s law; the two
ﬁrst digits are also more common in the data from Zimbabwe (288 observations).
On many levels it is unsurprising that many individual series with few observations will not ad-
here to Benford’s law (for example see Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor [2009]). As already noted and
illustrated by simulations in Nye and Moul (2007, Section I), it seems necessary to consider several
countries for the corresponding data subset to conform to Benford’s law; this is to increase hetero-
geneity at the initial levels and match the requirement provided by the property P2 that the number
n of separately drawn subsets should be large. For example, although for many individual OECD
countries the distribution of the ﬁrst digits does not conform to Benford’s law (as noted above), for
the entire set of the OECD countries for which we have data (which includes 22 countries) Benford’s








































1C.2.3 Anotherway forcorrecting forpersistence issues: selectingsome seriesfrom thebalance
of payments data
All methods described in the main body of this paper relied on considering for each country–quarter
pair all the 13 series that occur in the balance of payments data we obtained from the IMF. We now
study what happens when only some series are selected. To that end we considered two choices, the
independent series and the less persistent series.
The ﬁrst subset of series is formed by taking into account the identities that occur in the balance of
payments data and by removing a series for each such identity; several choices were possible and the
one we made is the following: Current account; Goods; Services; Income; Financial account; Direct
investment; Portfolio investment; Financial derivatives; Reserve assets; Net errors and omissions.
That is, we dropped the series: Current transfers; Capital account; Other investment.
The second subset of series is formed by taking, out of the 13 series, the 6 series which showed
on average the smallest persistence from one quarter to another. For each series and each country,
we computed the number of breaks in the sequence of the ﬁrst digits indexed by quarters and then
considered the average of these results with respect to countries. The series included in the resulting
subset are then: Financial account; Portfolio investment; Other investment; Financial derivatives;
Reserve assets; Net errors and omissions.
We ﬁrst study what happens for individual countries. We recall that using all series, the data
corresponding to 58 countries could be said to conform to Benford’s law whereas for 44 countries,
it did not pass the test (whereas for 1 country there was not enough data). For independent series,
the respective ﬁgures are 54, 44, and 5 while for the less persistent series, we obtain 78, 15, and 10.
Clearly, the persistence of the series does matter for rejections of Benford’s distribution for individual
countries.
In addition to this comparison, we also used the same random drawing methodology as above to
obtain Table XV. We only reported therein the results for all series and the less persistent ones since
the consideration of the independent series instead of all series almost does not change the picture for
any pair (C;M) (detailed results provided upon request). On the other hand, the restriction to series
chosen as being the less persistent ones ensures that for almost all pairs, the rejection rates get close
to or smaller than 5%.
This illustrates once again that the observed persistence is due to a lack of independence in the
quarter-to-quarter values of the series and is not linked to an intra-quarter dependence caused by the
identities between the series of the balance of payments.
Therefore, a method for correcting the persistence issues is to discard the most persistent series in
thebalanceofpaymentsdata; theremainingseriestypicallyexhibitbehaviorclosetowhatispredicted
by Benford’s law (as shown by the small rejection rates indicated in Table XV). The consideration
of the less persistent series brings auxiliary information on whether the possible non-conformity to
Benford’s law may not be due to the persistence of the balance of payments data. However, ﬁnding

















































































1  4 
 
  Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
  90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,200  5.5  6.3  7.2  8.0 
N = 2,000  7.0  7.9  9.1  9.5 
N = 5,000  6.9  7.8  9.0  9.8 
N = 10,000  6.9  7.5  8.7  9.9 
N = 30,000  6.8  7.5  8.7  9.5 
N = 50,000  6.8  7.7  9.0  9.7 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 





BOP series  Independent series  Less persistent series  All series 
Current account  yes  no  yes 
        Goods  yes  no  yes 
        Services  yes  no  yes 
        Income  yes  no  yes 
        Current transfers  no  no  yes 
Capital account  no  no  yes 
Financial account  yes  yes  yes 
        Direct investment  yes  no  yes 
        Portfolio investment  yes  yes  yes 
        Other investment  no  yes  yes 
        Financial derivatives  yes  yes  yes 
        Reserve assets  yes  yes  yes 
Net errors and omissions  yes  yes  yes 








































1  5 
 
Proportion  
f = 5% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 2,500  5.3  5.7  6.2  6.5 
N = 5,000  6.2  6.7  7.5  7.8 
N = 10,000  6.3  6.7  7.4  7.9 
N = 30,000  6.3  6.7  7.2  7.6 
N = 50,000  6.2  6.6  7.2  7.6 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 10% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,200  5.5  6.3  7.2  8.0 
N = 2,000  7.0  7.9  9.1  9.5 
N = 5,000  6.9  7.8  9.0  9.8 
N = 10,000  6.9  7.5  8.7  9.9 
N = 30,000  6.8  7.5  8.7  9.5 
N = 50,000  6.8  7.7  9.0  9.7 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 20% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,000  8.7  10.4  12.8  14.2 
N = 2,000  8.2  9.3  11.6  13.2 
N = 5,000  8.2  10.5  13.4  14.5 
N = 10,000  8.5  10.2  12.6  14.3 
N = 30,000  8.6  10.9  13.0  14.1 
N = 50,000  8.4  9.7  11.8  13.3 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 
N ≥ 1,000  8.7  10.9  13.4  14.5 
 
 
Table XIV: Estimates of the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable RD;1000 when D is
chosen at random according to Benford’s law and f equals 5% (top table), 10% (middle table), and
20% (bottom table); estimates were obtained by drawing D at random 1;000 times and computing

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1C.3 Countries included in the study
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Geor-
gia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazachstan, Korea, Kirghiz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Lithuania, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mex-
ico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, SouthAfrica, Spain,
SriLanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen (Republic of), Zim-
babwe
C.4 Complements to Section 6:
Results for country-quarter groups based on economic conditions
C.4.1 Crisis time evidence
Our model tells us (Proposition 5) that when more than expected fraction of countries experience
Bad states of productivity, more countries would misinform investors. Empirically, this is difﬁcult to
determine, as we do not know what the expectations of the r (the fraction of countries having a Good
state) were at any given time point. One can perfectly fathom a period with no global crisis, yet the
fraction of the countries with good states of the world being lower than expected, leading to more
countries misinforming. Nevertheless, in our sample period, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) claim that
there was one truly unexpected global ﬁnancial crisis in the years 1997–1998 that originated in Asia
and then spread across the globe, and this is what we investigate.
We use the stable sample and yearly data, because we want to have globally roughly the same
number of observations for each studied time period. We ﬁnd some evidence for 1997 but no results
for 1998. An interpretation in line with our model is that in 1998 it was already clear that the crisis
is going to affect many countries and investors adjusted their r; so fewer countries misinformed on
their state of the world. The evidence for 1997 shows that countries open to capital ﬂows (also those
with lower net foreign assets, higher total liabilities and with ﬁxed exchange rates) have rejections of
Benford’s distribution for their ﬁrst-digit data at levels lower than a 5% level. This is what we would
expect for our model in Section 3: the beneﬁt of embellishing statistics would be higher when many
countries would be in a bad state of the world, and for those that would be open to capital ﬂows.51
51Similar patterns appear for many categories for 1996 and 2006 if we investigate other years; without comprehensive








































1C.4.2 Geographical country groups
For the sake of completeness, and to compare to the previous results of Nye and Moul (2007)
or Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor (2009) who dealt with geographically-based country groupings, we
present the goodness-of-ﬁt tests of conformity of the ﬁrst-digit distributions with Benford’s distribu-
tion broken down geographically in Table LII (containing both main results and robustness checks).
Here we need to rely heavily on the 1-in-10 criterion as the persistence issue may be severe. We
ﬁnd that countries in Africa and the Middle East (grouped together in order to have a sufﬁcient large
number of observations) have suspect distributions of the ﬁrst digits both in the full and the stable
samples. Latin American countries in the stable sample, i.e., that provided data at least every year
between 1995 and 2007, also have a distribution of ﬁrst digits for which we can reject the hypothesis
that it was drawn from a Benford’s distribution. Finally, the 1-in-10 criterion ﬂags the rejection of
the null hypothesis at 5% for the stable sample and at 10% for the full sample for East European
countries. These ﬁndings should be taken with caution, however, as there are relatively few coun-
tries in each group with many quarters of data each, which may make rejecting the null hypothesis
easier (see Section 5.4 for discussion). Tests on the least persistent series do not conﬁrm any of the
ﬁndings. This may mean that it so happens that African, Middle Eastern and Latin American (and
potentially East European) countries have some economic series whose ﬁrst digits are very persistent
(i.e., evolve slowly) when termed in U.S. dollars, and these drive the rejections of Benford’s distribu-
tion. Furthermore, as there are few countries in each group, there may be little required heterogeneity
for the Benford’s law to hold in view of property P2; in the goodness-of-ﬁt tests the entire dataseries
are taken and mixed together. Wider economic criteria of grouping countries together might therefore
be better than narrow geographic ones. It may not be a primary feature of these countries that they
provide bad quality data on purpose.
C.4.3 Detailed tables
The tables included here contain more detailed results for the main results for the stable sample,
and the results for the full sample and robustness checks of the ﬁndings. Certain tables contain also
groupings using some further criteria that may be mentioned in the main text:
– net foreign assets as a ratio of GDP (NFA GDP);
– liabilities to GDP ratio (LIAB GDP);
– liabilities excluding foreign direct investment to GDP (LIAB EXCL FDI GDP);
– countries belonging to the OECD (OECD).
across the world that would cause such rejections. There were substantial falls (of over 20% over some periods) in 2006
global stock market indexes for emerging markets. But this does not indicate how many countries were implicated and
whether this would in fact constitute a global and substantial unexpected negative shock.
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